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ABSTRACT
Idealist Western philosophy has generally argued that the essence of the human is
ahisorical and resides in the mind, which has variously manifested in the form of soul,
spirit, language, discourse and so on. Matter, as in our bodies, has been seen as
inconsequential to our subjectivity, a mere tool and vehicle that the mind navigates.
This project argues, following the Marxist paradigm, that humans make and
transform themselves in the course of history. However, this continual self-creation is
not restricted to manifestations of our consciousness - politics, laws, etc.; rather, our
bodies are reconfigured as well, and hence our embodiment, the condition of the
unified experience of mind and body. It becomes the locus of meanings, production,
technologies and sociocultural processes. Changes introduced in the body affect the
mind and vice-versa, as the two are caught in a dialectical flux.
This act of making is always mediated by technology of some form. As both
Marx and Engels argue, since we are essentially makers and creators, and the process
of making always involves the application of the technological, it seems worthwhile
to approach the problem of embodiment through the lens of the cyborg - a hybrid of
machine and organism. Donna Haraway writes that the cyborg symbolizes the
reconstitutive human. The cyborgian figure articulates our current reality. In our
wearable computers and our pacemakers, we find our organicism continually
breached, such that “the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body,
self-developing and externally designed.” Similarly, the cyborg arises as a symbol of
this perennially reconfigured human at the intersection of the various processes and
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knowledges that have informed and facilitated that configuration in the last two
centuries.
I have used the cyborg as a tool to capture the historically evolving human in
its various moments of praxis to examine the implications of embodiment. Utilizing
the basic premise of the cyborg, I have tried to demonstrate the human as an openended set of labouring and rational potentialities involved in its own production and
reproduction, and hence in its continual transcendence, through the only process of
self-making it knows - technology.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE TROUBLE WITH CYBORGS
In the 1960s, a NASA scientist called Janies Lovelock discovered the Gaia. Lovelock
was developing a system for perceiving planetary activity through atmospheric
analysis which could be used as a viable method for detecting life on Mars. During
his experiments, Lovelock stumbled upon a unique view of the earth and its
atmosphere which he termed “Gaia.” He found that the observed composition of the
earth’s atmosphere could not be maintained by chemical processes alone; rather, it
was “the product of the life-processes of organisms,” and more importantly, “the
atmosphere was an extension of a living system designed to maintain an optimal
environment for its own support.” In other words, as Donna Haraway explains in her
introduction to The Cyborg Handbook, the Gaia explains the way the earth - its
biosphere, geography, inhabitants - cybemetically organizes itself in order to sustain
life. According to this hypothesis, “the whole earth is a dynamic, self-regulating,
homeostatic system... that terminally blurred the boundaries between the geological,
the organic and the technological” (Haraway Cyborgs and Symbionts xiii). That is,
our world functions through an endless series of connected entities that maintain
equilibrium (and disequilibrium) through a grand dialectical process facilitating its
own evolution.
Haraway argues that this planetary cybemeticism is mirrored in the human
realm. If as a mere organism on this planet, humanity forms a part of the
macrocosmic Gaia, then a similar microcosmic system permeates the immediate
human world which obviously enters into a complex relationship with the totality. As
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humans, we symbiotically evolve with the technological and natural realms in a way
that undermines the borders we have drawn between ourselves and these spheres.
And such a structure is mediated by the image of the cyborg - “a hybrid of machine
and organism” - which is simultaneously identity position, narrative, and practical
reality that tries to make sense of our presence in a world that has witnessed a
massive escalation of technological forces and scientific knowledge, particularly in
the latter part of the twentieth century. Haraway writes:
Lovelock’s earth... is the natural habitat, and the launching pad, of
other cyborgs... Gaia is not the figure of the whole earth’s selfknowledge, but of her discovery, indeed her literal constitution, in a
great travel epic. The signals emanating from an extraterrestrial
perspective... are relayed and translated through the informationprocessing machines built by the members of a voraciously energy
consuming, space-faring hominid culture that calls itself Mankind...
the people who built the semiotic and physical technology to see Gaia
became the global species, in which they recognized themselves,
through the concrete practices by which they built their knowledge.
{Cyborgs and Symbionts xiii-xiv)
Yet the cyborg subverts the very essence of the human, at least in the way it has been
articulated in traditional Western philosophy. Christian theology had offered a special
status to humankind on earth - a creation of God after his own image, irrevocably
separated from and superior to not only the natural world but also the world that they
had built themselves. The Renaissance gave birth to a variation of this myth, that of
the rational individual who masters the natural realm through his artifice and
knowledge. Although religious moorings substantially weakened during this period,
most sixteenth century thinkers still believed in the ‘homocentric’ and ‘geocentric’
cosmos, with “man as the measure of the divinely-created system of (he universe”
(Porter 13). Even when the great physicists and mathematicians of the next century
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“destroyed the old harmonies of the anthropocentric universe,” they only reiterated
the superiority of the individual over mechanistic, lifeless nature. For instance, in
establishing the soul as the marker of humanity, subordinating the mind to the body,
and contending that all living creatures with the exception of humans were merely
machines, Rene Descartes reasserted Renaissance individualism in the garb of
mathematical rationality.
The Enlightenment furthered this individualistic impulse. Through its
unshakeable faith in human progress, it legitimized bourgeois ideology and its view
of technology as a mere tool for economic and scientific progress, which
consequently morphed into domination and dehumanization:
It is also important not to forget that Smithian economics provided an
apologetics for capitalism in an age of industrialization... The new
social sciences developed by the philosophes... did not provide
anything like a searching critique of commercial society, with its
sanctification of private property and individual interests. In many
ways, the new Enlightenment ‘hymn’ to progress turned a blind eye to
the equally biting inequalities and oppressions of the new commercial
and industrial order. (Porter 22-23)
Although the Enlightenment replaced a Christian myth with a scientific one - one
more appropriate for an age of technology and industrialization (Porter 21) - the
borders around the human were sharply drawn. By ignoring the dialectical
relationship between humans, nature, and technology, Enlightenment thinkers missed
a crucial step in understanding our ontological status. Their faith in the rationality and
superiority of humans blinkered their vision; what they refused to acknowledge “was
the element of passivity in our experience: the external situation which we do not
create but which imposes itself on us” (Timpanaro 34). Even when this “external
situation” is of human origin, the fact that its effects often supercede our intentions
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was largely ignored. The veneration of the mind and the subordination of the body,
the refusal to see the external as a part of the internal, allowed them to strictly
distinguish the human from what is not human. And whatever fell outside the human
category could be subjugated and put to economic and progressive use. In fact, the
Western bourgeois instinct of exploiting the proletariat, the colonized, and women,
has the same roots as that of dominating nature and technology. While the former
were categorized as sub-humans,1the latter was relegated to the realm of the non
human. More significantly, all of them belonged to the body, the corporeal, and the
material. In fact, the body is despised because of its materiality. Moreover, the body
is likened to a machine - the metaphor lies at the heart of the Enlightenment view of
human ontology and technology - which is maneuvered by the soul, the true marker
of human subjectivity. Of course, just like tools, the body serves certain purposes, but
is ultimately dispensable. Body A is as good as body B - it has little bearing on the
individual’s being.2
Edgar Allan Poe’s brilliant short story “The Man That Was Used Up”
provides a telling example of this outlook. The narrative revolves around a military
officer, Brevet Brigadier General John A.B.C. Smith. After being badly wounded and
decapitated in several successful campaigns, the general is reduced to “being an
exceedingly odd looking bundle.” However, with the help of modem prosthetics,
which he puts on daily, the general becomes the very epitome of masculinity with his

1 For more about bourgeois categorizations o f the working classes in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, see Henry Mayhew, London Labour and The London Poor (New York: Dover Publications,
1968).
2 Mumford traces the relationship between the development o f machines and the contempt for the body
to medieval Christian ideals in an extremely illuminating discussion. See “Cultural Preparation” in
Technics and Civilization (Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), 9-55.
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flowing hair, towering height, and “the ne plus ultra of good legs.” What is striking is
that the changes observed by the narrator are merely physiological and superficial.
The general’s arrogance, overbearing personality and pomposity remain intact even
without his “cork leg” and “palate.” His prosthetic adornments simply transform his
physical appearance without changing his innate characteristics. The general is
always himself - with or without his artificial body parts. The story illuminates a
crucial point: body and technology are interchangeable because ontologically both
have the same status: they are mere addenda.
Such thinking continues to this day, albeit in a garb of heightened pessimism.
For instance, theorists such as Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul think of
technoscience as a deviation from the humanistic impulse. While Mumford calls
machines antisocial by nature, Ellul argues that both machines and capitalism are
only results of the technisization of every aspect of human life. Ellul introduces the
term “technique,” which he defines as an organizational and mechanistic rationality
that permeates every aspect of our society. Technique precludes technology and is an
end in itself - that is, it will overthrow everything, including humans, that stands in its
way. Interestingly, he writes: “When technique enters into every area of life, it ceases
to be external to man and becomes his very substance. It is no longer face to face with
man but is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs him” (6). While this may
seem cyborgian, Ellul writes about technique under the sign of mourning: the
emphasis is on “absorbs” - in the sense of consumption - and not “integrated.”
Similarly, a lot of twentieth-century science fiction Subscribes to this ideology. There
is a clear ontological difference between the “robot” and the “cyborg.” The robot is
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the technological Other, a once dominated machine species that shall ultimately rise
up against the human race and altogether wipe it out. The relationship is essentially
antagonistic - it is either them or us. Even if there is a hint of pacification in the end,
such as in Asimov’s I, Robot, the distinction exists. The robots in Asimov’s novel
take over every aspect of human praxis, including their very preservation and
survival. But it is a radical displacement, and subversion, of human presence and will;
nowhere is a productive symbiosis suggested.
Yet the seeds of the cyborg were sown during the Enlightenment, whose
ideological trajectories, according to Porter, were more ambiguous and varied than
they seem. This heterogeneity would become much clearer in the 19th century when a
group of thinkers would continue the tradition, but with major modifications. In many
ways, Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein is arguably one of the most cogent
distillations of Enlightenment technoscience and thought, sometimes even more
articulate than many contemporary philosophical tracts. But it also marks a split from
the tradition, as Shelley begins to question the very ideas that informed her work.
This ideological chasm is mirrored in the novel: the bourgeois Frankenstein begets
the monster through his mastery over technology and nature, but his “surrogate son”
is an entirely new species, walking an altogether different ontological plane.
Speculative fiction has rarely been this precise. A few more decades into the
nineteenth century, Charles Darwin and Karl Marx would investigate some of the
issues explored by Shelley in her work. Through their socio-scientific findings, both
these seminal theorists gave existing human ontology a crucial ideological blow.
While the former irrevocably leveled the distinction between the natural and human
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realm, the latter radically emphasized the way humans are constituted (and in his
particular case, dehumanized) by their own technologies. In their theories, we get the
first glimpse of a cyborgian world - a co-evolution of humanity, nature and
technology, one acting upon the other through a matrix of enormous complexity.
Their collective concerns were bom out of a crisis in explaining human presence and
praxis that was not merely ideological. Rather, their observations emerged out of
reality and were intricately connected to a quotidian existence increasingly mediated
by machines and science. That crisis is far from being resolved. What began as an
unprecedented growth in science and technology during the industrial revolution has
now become a full fledged phenomenon whose effects cannot be denied. Haraway
writes: “By the late twentieth century... the boundary between animal and human is
thoroughly breached. The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not
turned into amusement parks - language, tool use, social behaviour, mental events,
nothing really convincingly settles the separation of the human from the animal” (A
Cyborg Manifesto 151). She further argues that “late twentieth-century machines
have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind
and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that
used to apply to organisms and machines” (A Cyborg Manifesto 152). The cyborg
proliferates in such a world.
But, what exactly is a cyborg? Is it a new species that techno-dreamers
conjure from nowhere? How does it differ from the human, or is there any difference
to start with? Manfred Clines and Nathan Kline coined the term in the 1960s as a
reference to technologically amplified human beings who would be able to go
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through extreme conditions during space flights. These people would be fitted with
various enhancing technological parts which would work cybemetically - that is, the
machines and the body would be programmed to alter their function according to
changes in the environment. The image is kind of like a “standard white laboratory rat
implanted with an osmotic pump designed to continuously modify and regulate
homeostatic states.”
Common parlance and Hollywood have unfortunately appropriated the term
over the years such that it immediately conjures up images of a Terminator and
Robocop, although the military origins of the cyborg and the technological invasion
of the flesh make them an imminent reality. However, the term has been broadened
by recent theorists in order to postulate a new kind of human ontology - one that
effectively explains human praxis in the midst of real technological development:
There are many actual cyborgs among us in society. It’s not just
Robocop, it is our grandmother with a pacemaker. Not just Geordi but
also our colleague with the myloelectric prosthetic arm. Not just the
cyberwarriors of a hundred militaristic science fiction stories, but
arguably anyone whose immune system has been programmed through
vaccination to recognize and kill the polio virus. Not just the fighterbomber pilot in the state-of-the-art cockpit who can target enemies
with the eyes, fire missiles with a word and who uses computers to
monitor his or her own body... but also the potentially billions of
humans yet unborn who will be the products of genetic engineering.
(Gray 3)
Donna Harlaway, arguably the progenitor of cyborg theory, writes that the cyborg is
both a metaphor for our lived experience and a creature of science fiction (A Cyborg
Manifesto 149). She posits a cyborg ontology as opposed to the human, a category
which she argues needs major modifications if it is to be relevant and useful in our
present world. In fact, when Haraway says cyborgs are a hybrid of organism and
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machine, she is being both literal and metaphorical - literal, in the sense that our
technologies, as evident from the examples cited above, have undergone a major
qualitative change in the last few decades. In Western capitalist society, the artificial
has been irrevocably juxtaposed with our organic selves, such that anything other
than a co-evolutionary paradigm is unthinkable. Moreover, these couplings quite
obviously problematize the ontological assumptions associated with the human
category. Take the implications of sexuality for instance. In traditional formulations
of gender and sex, the physical differences between male and female accounted for
the socially-constructed roles that each category was assigned to. While many of
these assumptions have been questioned by feminists at a discursive level, current
technologies have actually made it possible to obfuscate the configurations of gender
and sexuality through distinct corporeal interventions. Gray notes that “a woman in
an exoskeleton might be 1000 times stronger than a man” (6). Similarly, hormonal
therapies and prosthetic devices can literally transform bodies and sexual idenitities.
Haraway often cites modem medical practice such as artificial insemination, genetic
modifications, and so on, to establish the corporeal ramifications of cyborg
technologies in relation to sexuality. She insists that such technology-assisted genderbending persuade and allow us to rethink some of oiir theoretical assumptions about
sexual “truths.”
The metaphorical follows the literal. If humans are indeed being corporeally
changed into machine-organism complexes by 20th and 21st century technology, then
a similar shift is occurring on a discursive level. Both critical theory and scientific
knowledge in the last two centuries have radically altered configurations of race,
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gender, evolution, history, and praxis that cannot be contained within traditional
definitions of the human. Thus the cyborg should also be seen as an orientation, as a
way of explaining our worldly experience in the midst of invasive technology,
biological determinism, and socio-political imperatives. It necessitates a need to
examine existing cultural discourses, affirm the fundamental role played by
technology, and reconstruct human history as a dialectical and symbiotic relationship
with not only the artificial realm, but also the natural one. To Douglas Kellner, “the
figure of the cyborg symbolizes our increasing mediation and constitution by
scientific knowledge and technological and communications systems... interrogates
and problematizes the borderlines between nature, animals, humans and technology,
showing how these boundaries are artificial and constructed and therefore subject to
reconstruction” {The Postmodern Adventure 191). Gray takes a similar stand, arguing
that in the face of such enormous changes in human presence and praxis in the world,
“it may help us to confront them if we accept our new status as cyborgs and begin to
look at them from a cyborgian point of view” (7).
Yet there are several problems with such strategies. Perhaps the most
significant of them, and the one that this thesis shall explore further, are the political
and economic affiliations of the cyborg. Our technologies and scientific knowledge
do not exist in an ideological vacuum. In Questioning Technology, Andrew Feenberg
argues that technology is not neutral; it is defined contextually by its relationship with
social and political structures. I argue that modem technologies are moored to the
particular praxis of capitalism. In fact, technology virtually mirrors the capitalist
enterprise which, according to Marx, is a vehicle for both unlimited progress and
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relentless domination. In an essay on technology, Herbert Marcuse provides us with a
telling example that not only effectively articulates the cyborg world, but also
identifies its most persistent demon:
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses his route
from the highway maps. Towns, lakes and mountains appear as
obstacles to be bypassed. The countryside is shaped and organized by
the highway... Numerous signs and posters tell the traveler what to do
and think... Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the
pause that refreshes... Business, technics, human needs and nature are
welded together into one rational and expedient mechanism. {Some
Social Implications o f Technology 46)
Marcuse’s message here is clear: if our world is increasingly mediated by technology,
then that happens under the sign of capitalism - the “expedient mechanism” - with all
its baggage of commodity fetishisim, profit motive, and so on. In fact, Marcuses’s
contemporaries, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno, were even more critical of
scientific knowledge and technology believing that “they were part and parcel of
existing process of production and social domination” (Kellner Critical Theory 86).
In contrast, most contemporary theorists, in an obvious postmodernist turn,
either ignore this spectre of capitalism or claim that it has been transcended - that we
are living in a post-capitalist, post-industrial world whose basis is technology and
informatics alone. In other words, technology has fulfilled its promise of global
emancipation and betterment; capitalism has either been overcome or Marx was
wrong. Gray writes: “Where do cyborgian technologies come from? Most have
military origins, although civilian medical research has become almost as important a
source. The other major centers of actual cyborg creation are entertainment... and
work (the computer industry, certainly but also the cybemetization of all industry)”
(3). Quite plainly, all of these sources of technological development are fueled by the
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logic of capitalism, at least in the Western world. While he goes on to delineate the
nature and praxis of cyborgs, Gray never takes into account the contested nature of
their origins. In fact, not so surprisingly, not a single essay in The Cyborg Handbook
(arguably the definitive collection of cyborg theory) deals with this particular
concern. Rather, the terms “post-industrial” and “post-capitalist” occur with an
alarming regularity. In this sense, Haraway is shrewd in her engagement. She
acknowledges the capitalist origins of the cyborg: “The main trouble with cyborgs, of
course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal
capitalism, not to mention state socialism” (A Cyborg Manifesto 151). But the way it
unsettles bourgeois conceptions and practices of masculinity fits her feminist agenda.
Although her analysis has useful implications for feminism, she has little to offer for
humanity at large. Her assertion that “illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly
unfaithful to their origins” (ACM 151) is more wishful thinking than rigorous
criticism.
Kellner refutes such utopianism. Although he argues that “the capitalist
relations of production and the imperative to maximize capital accumulation continue
to be central constitutive forces” (Critical Theory 111), he acknowledges that
capitalism in the new millennium is a significantly different beast. Not only is the
world in which the cyborg proliferates not free of capitalist hegemony, rather it marks
a new phase in its gradual evolution, which Kellner calls “technocapitalism”:
The term points to a configuration of capitalist society in which
technical and scientific knowledge, automation, computers and
advanced technology play a role in the process of production to the
role of human labor power, mechanization and machines in earlier eras
of capitalism, while producing as well new modes of social
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organization and forms of culture and everyday life. (Critical Theory
179)
And it is this persistence of capitalist forces that should compel us to be more critical.
McNally argues that much of postmdemist theory is a continuation of bourgeois
thought. Indeed, in such a scenario, the mere exhortations of cybrog theorists and
their apolitical, uncritical acceptance of capitalist forces do not seem to be a
productive stance, since many of their claims regarding technoscience are subverted
by bourgeois/capitalist practice. Capitalism distorts the very essence of technology by
commodifying it. It subverts questions and obfuscates answers. What is the basis of
our relationship with technology? What is its nature? Why do we feel different when
we introduce a machine into our bodies? Profit motives turn a blind eye to the
intrinsic character of technology. The “expedient mechanism” of capitalism turns
machines into trends, desires, and markets. Kellner argues:
Reductionism remains the ruling mentality of technoscience and
commodification its structural form. By now, compared to when Marx
composed Das Kapital in the 1860s, capitalism has commodified even
more dimensions of nature, society and the body (from DNA theft and
biopiracy to kidneys put up for bid on eBay). (Postmodern Adventure
102)
But he also acknowledges that current technoscientific perspective is ripe with new,
interesting possibilities: “Reconstructive postmodern theories situate science in a
political, ethical, and ecological context in hopes of transforming science and
technology into progressive powers of change and emancipation” (Kellner
Postmodern Adventure 102). But to do that, we have to delineate the roots of
technology and its evolution because without such an act of historicism a genuine
understanding seems impossible.
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Yet cyborg theorists seem strangely recalcitrant about this historicity. In fact,
both Gray and Haraway are extremely contradictory in their understanding of the
cyborg perspective and history. Although Haraway welcomes a reworking of human
history through existent scientific and theoretical tools, she is often wary of
historicism because of the legacy of patriarchal subjugation present in them. On the
other hand, Gray is thoroughly dismissive of any kind of historical approach:
But haven’t people always been cyborgs?... This is an argument
many people make, including early cyborgologists Manfred Clynes
and J.E. Steele. The answer, is in a word, no. Certainly, we can look
back from the present at some human-tool and human-machine
relationships and say, ‘Yes, that looks very cyborgian,’ but this is
only possible because of hindsight... Cyborgian elements of
previous human-tool and human-machine relationships are only
visible from our current point of view. (6)
Gray is right in claiming that the cyborg is not an ahistorical continuum; it makes
little sense to imagine our hominid ancestors that way. But, if earlier humans were not
cyborgs, it is because they did not possess a cyborgian consciousness, something to
which we are privy only in the present. Neither science nor technology is a new mode
of human practice; we have used both since the beginning of our history to
understand our place in the world and enhance our presence in it. But a hammer or a
walking stick, though indispensable and utilitarian as tools, do not make our intimate
and dialectical relationship with technology too apparent. On the contrary, when we
incorporate direct changes in our body by replacing an organ or animate our tools
with “artificial intelligence,” past relationships not only become clearer, but are also
reworked. The cyborgian consciousness is an evolving product that finds its voice
within and through present technoscientific practice. It entails a reconstruction of our
ontological essence, which in turn necessitates a projection of our present awareness
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and discursive knowledge into the past in order to reconfigure it. In this sense, the
early toolmakers and the industrial workers become part of a single cyborgian
trajectory, significant milestones on the discursive map of our existence. Therefore,
cyborg theory should not only be an exercise in differentiation, but also in collation.
The approach might seem reductionist but it is not without its uses. Most importantly,
it helps us to explore our past relationships with technology and better understand the
roots of particular modes of thinking and practice that still persist in our society.
What have been the implications of technological progress in the past? How have
they been articulated? How can we think about them in terms of the present and viceversa? These are some of the questions that need to be explored if our present
conditions of embodiment and socio-scientific change can be used for any kind of
emancipatory politics. To ignore the historical instinct, as many cyborg theorists do,
would be to forfeit the advantages of the cyborgian perspective to which we now have
access.
Both the question of historicity and the persistence of capitalism bring us to
the central concern of the project: the relationship of technology with embodiment.
“Posthumanists” often harbour the naive illusion of “transcendence from the body,
the natural world, ecological exigencies, socioeconomic realities, and compelling
ethical and political issues” (Kellner Postmodern Adventure 196). This flight from the
real world, real people, and real problems underlines the most significant problem of
cyborgian theory and practice. Perhaps one of the chief reasons why the radical
possibilities of the cyborg still remain an empty rhetoric can be traced back to this
lack of critical engagement and detachment from embodiment. Cyborg theorists often
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revert to traditional dualisms of mind and body while claiming to alleviate these
antagonisms. For instance, Haraway posits our current technologies as “ether,
quintessence,” engaged in the simulation of consciousness (A Cyborg Manifesto 153).
One may argue that the Internet and virtual realities multiply and problematize
traditional notions of embodiment and subjectivity. But no way does that imply the
disappearance of the body. While modem technobodies (both metaphorical and
literal) might herald the Foucaldian “death of man,” they do not entail the dissolution
of embodiment. Whether cybemetically programmed to alter its conditions in harsh
circumstances or physically attached to inorganic systems, the embodied self persists.
Our feelings of pain, suffering, or happiness might be radically changed by
technological presence, but we still experience these emotions. Moreover, these
experiences are themselves conditioned by certain socio-political structures which to
a large extent operate through various technological modes. A cyborg can still be
monitored, manipulated and ultimately destroyed, even more effectively than was
possible in earlier ages - greater possibilities always mean greater danger. By
denying the cyborg a historical trajectory, “posthumanists” suspend the recognition of
the body as refashioned, invaded and dominated by ages of technological apparatus.
If the cyborg is to be of any relevance to us, then the discreet changes and continuities
affected by technology need to be examined within the framework of history, politics,
and embodiment. Any kind of critical engagement with the cyborg should begin with
the persistence of the dialectic of domination and progress, and not its resolution.
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This instinct propels this project. In the following chapters, I shall construct a
genealogy of the cyborg.3 In charting and exploring its points of emergence, I shall
attempt to draw out not only its history of domination, commodification, and
dehumanization, but also its intricate relationship with human labour, socialism, and
embodiment. Starting from the evolution of man from apes through the use of
communicative labour and tools to modern-day complexities of technological
embodiment and praxis, my work shall try to weave a consistent narrative about the
matrix of technology and humans.
However, the project does not intend to be a comprehensive history of
technology. Not only is that beyond its scope, it is hardly the intention. Rather, this
work shall only single out and analyze those significant moments in history when our
relationship with technology is significantly contested and polarized. The three
chapters can be roughly divided into three historical periods: first, the prehistoric
transitionary phase from apes to humans; second, the Industrial revolution and its
aftermath; and third, the 20th century and the new millennium. This is not to say that
the period between the first signs of toolmaking and the Industrial Revolution is not
significant. Indeed, the technological development that marks this time is thoroughly
engaging and important. But technology in its essence remains more or less static

3 Methodologically, I follow Foucault’s genealogical structure used in the unfinished, three-volume
The History o f Sexuality. Although in his other works, he generally examines “the entangled and
confused parchments” o f a particular historical period, such restrictions are not implicit in the
genealogical method. This is more than confirmed by the dual archaeological and genealogical method
o f The History o f Sexuality. In this work, Foucault explores the experience and implications o f
sexuality in Western society, from the Greeks to the nineteenth century - a historical sweep that might
appear to undermine the examination of the minutae that genealogy entails. What actually
differentiates genealogy from history, I think, is the critical orientation. As opposed to history,
genealogy “must record the singularity of events outside o f any monotonous finality” (Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History 139). While I cannot lay claim to the kind o f “relentless erudition” the
genealogical method demands, I hope to remain faithful to it by trying to lay out the mutually opposing
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during this period. Of course, the scale and scope of things change - the stone axe
becomes the scythe, the sewing needle becomes the spindle - but technology rem ains
an intensely personal prosthesis. On the other hand, the coming of the factories
depersonalizes machines. It marks a qualitative leap in the very nature of technology,
an explosive culmination of years of scientific progress, which is further complicated
by the advent of capitalism because of the unique way it reorganizes technology.
To underline this genealogical study, I shall analyze and examine a variety of
discourses - evolutionary theory, science fiction, critical and philosophical theory,
and technological history. However, all of this shall be grounded by a consistent
critique of capitalist intervention through the works of not only Marx and Engels, but
various commentators on and critics of Marxist theory. Aware of the methodological
concerns that might arise from the eclecticism of the sources under examination, I
would like to argue that in this case the broad spectrum is faithful to cyborgian
embodiment and dialecticism, two fundamental threads that run through this project.
Haraway’s insistence that the cyborg is “a creature of social reality as well as a
creature of fiction” (A Cyborg Manifesto 147) is not entirely unfounded. Here, she
uses “fiction” in the broader sense of textuality (science fiction, philosophy, etc.)
while social reality quite obviously implies material presence. The cyborg arises at
their points of intersection. Evolutionary biology or cyberpunk novels tell only half
the story; the rest is articulated by an actual pacemaker beating in someone’s heart or
by the casual wage-labourer who operates a machine in a factory. In fact, science
fiction as a literary genre shows itself as the most potent signifier, often naming the

and varying modes o f technological development and articulation within a period and not resorting to
any kind o f teleological finality.
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unnamed and intercepting the shape of things to come. Similarly, this eclectic
approach also validates Engels’ assertion in his seminal collection, Dialectics o f
Nature, that dialectical analysis should be developed as a science of interconnections
between ideological and material concerns.
The first chapter will examine the primordial relationship between humans
and technology and the important role played by labour, toolmaking, and cooperative
activity in the development of human society. I argue that the emergence of humans
through their ability to make tools and its consequent impact on the development of
language and society marks a kind of prehistoric cyborgian moment. The discussion
shall revolve around Engels’ groundbreaking but oft-ignored essay, “The Part Played
by Labour in Transition from Ape to Man,” and the works of other relevant
evolutionary biologists. Of particular relevance to this analysis is the work of David
McNally, whose seminal Marxist critique of language and materialism, Bodies o f
Meaning, shall be critically examined to both vindicate and expand on Engels’ work.
Taking off on this trajectory, I shall further argue, through the works of Philip Fisher
and Elaine Scarry, that technology involves a remaking of the human image - both
body and mind. What the primordial human found advantageous and necessary in its
embodied praxis, it replicated through tools and machines. This act of technological
production in turn led (and leads) to significant changes in human embodiment itself.
This self-perpetuating transaction lies at the heart of our relationship with technology,
which is again reflected in human sociability which, according to Marx, is the essence
of the species.
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But the bourgeois emphasis on individualism and private property (which can
be traced back to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment) subverted this very socialist
impulse in technological and human development, a tendency that manifested its
horrors through capitalism in the dehumanizing realities of the industrial revolution.
Domination and dehumanization catch up with progress, as the two are caught in a
dialectical matrix. The second chapter tackles this very issue, transposing the
hominid, pre-historical cyborg to the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries - the
era of factories, steam power, and technological explosion. Bruce Mazlish traces the
birth of the industrial revolution back to the textile industry, which was thoroughly
motivated by capitalist designs of exporting cheap clothes throughout the imperial
realm. The economic impulse speeded up mechanical inventions not only in the area
of cloth manufacturing, but in other industries as well. The bond between humans and
technology is lost; the social essence of labour is perverted.
In the first volume of Capital, Marx mourns this violent rupture. In the
capitalist mode of production, the worker is reduced to watching the machines and
correcting its mistakes, a “merely mechanical part of being the moving power” (374).
The labourer becomes a mere “hand,” alienated from the very product of his own
labour. Marx concludes that in the capitalist factory system, the machine-human
symbiosis is lost. Marx does not lament the development of technology; on the
contrary, he argues that our machines will lead us down the path of emancipation
through new, intimate couplings. But, in the industrial system, the join between
humans and machines becomes antagonistic because of capitalist organization. By
making the labourer a prosthesis for the machines, simply a part of its “countless
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working organs,” capitalism subverts the transactory essence of technology in its
earlier modes of development. The construction and subsequent retrieval of the
human image embedded in our tools is suspended. However, at the same time, Marx
observes the human-machine complex as a new form of embodiment, a reconstruction
of bodily limits and boundaries, one that problematizes human agency and
subjectivity - a prescient premonition of the cyborg.
Marx’s apprehensions find their fictional counterpart in Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein. Although the work predates Marx by a few decades, it anticipates his
analysis, providing us with possibly the most potent and imaginative meditation on
our relationship with science and technology during that particular era. But why
Frankenstein? The monster is arguably the first cyborg, a symbol of the constitution
of modem humans by their own scientific knowledge, technology, and politics.
Indeed, the novel grew out of Shelley’s ideas about these significant facets of her age.
In fact, it is a textual patchwork of these very concerns, which is doubled in the act of
the monster’s actual, material creation. Among other things, the novel is an allegory
of the ultimate perversion of the bourgeois hubris and the dehumanizing process
unleashed by the industrial revolution and scientific discoveries. In the monster, we
find the monadic, crystallized manifestation of these discursive concerns. Its different
body parts, literally and metaphorically stitched together, form not only the
consciousness of the wr-cyborg, but also reveal the world that forged out such a
consciousness. As a technological, organic, and discursive product, the monster
continually hints at a world and an embodied reality in which we find ourselves in
today.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

In a way, Shelley acts as the perfect foil for Marx. The latter only analyzes the
already present forms of economic and technological culture. To be fair, the cyborg is
always latent in Marx’s analysis, never explicit. Frankenstein, on the other hand,
articulates emergent social experiences, whose unified meaning and implications
were still nebulous when the novel was first published. In its extraordinary moments
of prescience, Shelley’s work hints at the reality that might be unleashed by
technoscientific practice, what forms of embodiment it might produce, how it might
transform the inviolable human into a monstrous jumble. The monster, as I shall
argue, both anticipates and articulates the cyborg, which makes the novel
indispensable for my analysis.
But why impose the figure of the cyborg on prehistoric humans, the industrial
subject, and Shelley’s monster when theorists argue that the cyborg is a quintessential
postmodern figure, a fecund symbol unique to our era? I have already discussed some
of the reasons earlier. But the most important reason for my critical engagement lies
in my wish to anchor the cyborg into the real world of labour, praxis, and
embodiment, to wrench it away from hollow theoretical, linguistically-charged,
postmodernist mind games. In the first two chapters, I demonstrate that technology in
history has always operated on the realm of the body. With the changes it introduced
in our embodiment, it has affected our various modes of praxis. While these
alterations are significantly different in the present world, they nonetheless still
operate on the human body - at times intensifying its presence, at others
problematizing it. This forms the basis of the third chapter, in which I shall outline
not only the continuities with previous historical phases and their socio-political
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relevance, but also the discontinuities introduced by current technoscientific practice.
I shall particularly analyze the ontologically complex works of Australian techno
artist Stelarc, new forms of biological/medical technologies and, most importantly,
the personal computer and the Internet. Both the PC and the Internet are crucial to my
discussion not only because they are arguably the technologies that symbolize the
new millennium, but also because they are the most active sites of contestation in
both theory and practice.
However, what follows should not be seen as a manifesto. Its aims are more
humble. To talk about human society without objects, machines, and tools is
completely absurd. Our technologies are built in our own image; our selves are
reproduced, enhanced, and modified in our machines. Through them, we open up to
the world, to other beings. Our machines enact our social essence; they externalize
our sentience, directing it at others. In Haraway’s words, cyborgs are needy for
connections. We must understand ourselves as organic-mechanical complexes,
working together through past, present and future, for better or for worse. However,
bourgeois ideology and capitalism continually subvert this position by masking the
continuity between machines and humans. In doing so, it only escalates our “terror”
of technology because within the capitalist system, the human image in machines is
always hidden. In this work, I use the cyborg to build a historical consciousness that
might help us weave our machines back into our embodied selves. Whether, as
cyborgs, we can open up possibilities of resistance and emancipation is quite another
question, one that is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. But I think the first
step towards any kind of radical practice should perhaps begin with looking at how
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technologies constitute and change our embodiment, since our bodies - organic,
electronic, material whatever - are the only ways we can know and engage with the
world. That is my central thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
PREHISTORIC CYBORGS: TALKING TOOLS. MORPHING HANDS
The origin of technology is disputed territory. The point of contention relates to our
conception of language and brain, arguably the two crucial manifestations of the
mind. Which came first: our ability to communicate or our toolmaking capabilities?
Were tools simply a material formulation enabled by the development of the human
brain or did the act of making primordial hunting weapons lead to more enlightened
minds? These questions have been widely debated in the last century, and still
continue to plague theorists despite recent evidence that tilts the balance to one side.
Indeed, the matrix of technology, language, and mind is particularly important
because it lies at the heart of much of our traditional, and present, ideas about
technology.
The mind, and its most obvious manifestation, language, have been long held
by philosophers and thinkers from humanist disciplines as the harbingers of
civilization. There can be little doubt about this assertion; it would be absurd to think
otherwise. Through speech, humans added an altogether new and significant
dimension to their existence. But the trouble lies elsewhere. In making language the
motor of human culture and praxis, theorists only invoke the superiority of the mind
over the body, the intellect over the visceral, lived experience. Through this stance,
everything is subordinated to the brain, including embodied human praxis.
Surprisingly, even scientists - for all the allegations of materialist reductionism
leveled against them - have reinforced the primacy of the brain in their findings.
Stephen Jay Gould argues that the scientific search for the missing link in the
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transition from ape to man was subverted for a long time due to its attention to the
wrong body part - the brain - and by the emphasis on man-as-intellect rather than on
man-as-creator or man-as-maker {Posture 207). On this point, he notes how scientific
research itself is influenced by the ideological trends of a particular time: “Debates
based on no evidence are the most revealing in the history of science, for in the
absence of factual constraints, the cultural biases that affect all thought lie nakedly
exposed” {Posture 210). As I have argued in the introduction, such tendencies have
allowed us to sharply demarcate the borders between not only ourselves and
technology, but also between ourselves and nature. In subscribing to the view that we
only proceeded to make tools after our evolutionary humanization was complete, we
relegate our machines to the status of mere adjuncts. At the risk of being too
simplistic, I argue that such ideas reiterate the point that our technologies basically
have no effect on us. Similarly, this conception undermines the role of our own
embodiment and physicality in the development of technology, and its significance in
shaping our intellectual capabilities for navigating the world.
I argue that much of our fear of technology stems from this very outlook. Our
machines do not speak. Even if they have “minds,” they are rudimentary. Yet
repeatedly over time, they have been able to subvert our humanity with their material
presence. The very fact that technological artifacts do not have a “soul,” and can still
evince lifelike characteristics, seems incomprehensible (and horrifying) to us. A
substantial amount of science fiction hinges on the antagonism between the human
mind and artificial intelligence. Strangely, machines or robots, as long as they show
no signs of sentience, remain mere slaves or tools. Humans relinquish power (or are
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forced to do it) only when machines become thinking, conscious beings - that is,
when they learn to undermine their own materiality.
McNally argues that postmodernist theory is rife with this aversion to
materiality, as it gives sovereignty in all areas to language/mind. Claiming that this
hierarchal structure is a continuation of bourgeois ideology and a distinct
manifestation of our commodified society, he notes that “the desiring bodies,
performative bodies, cyborg bodies” (italics mine) of postmodernist discourse are not
real, biological, living bodies at all:
There is something curiously attenuated about the postmodern body. It
has been de-materialized, relieved of matter, biology, the stuff of
organs, blood, nerves and sinews. Even desire is commonly abstracted
from the body, reduced to a metaphysical drive to overcome
ontological “lack,” our incompleteness as beings... The postmodern
body is thus constituted by a radical disawoval of corporeal substance.
And just as it leaps out of nature, so it catapults itself beyond history
and society. (McNally 2)
In the postmodern body, blood and muscles are replaced by text; hence, it can be
rewritten and reconfigured, “constructed through discourse, by disembodied Western
intellectuals” (McNally 2). While McNally is not entirely correct in his labeling of the
cyborg, his argument cannot be dismissed. In much of Haraway’s writings, and
especially in “The Cyborg Manifesto,” she admits that her cyborgian ontologisms
undermine lived, bodily relations (152). She sees both textuality and codification as
the unifyinjg and constitutive essence of the cybernetic species. Concomitantly, her
cyborg thrives in the commodified orgy of late capitalism, has “no truck with
unalienated labour,” and the diseases evoked by them “are no more than miniscule
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coding changes of an antigen in the immune system” (154).4 Similarly, much of
current scientific knowledge, another constituting factor for the cyborg, professes
such a staunch materialism that it almost reverses itself into a kind of ultra-textuality.
Ideas such as that of “the selfish gene,” which makes DNA the sole arbiters of
organic development, subvert the complex evolution of species. Current cyborgian
dreams of generating clones by tweaking genetic patterns, by inscribing a new textual
code in place of another, align themselves with the postmodernist praxis of language
worship.5 Scientists such as Richard C. Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould reject such
formulations, emphasizing the fact that organisms must be viewed as a complex
systems, where codifications of neuclotides matter as much as the presence and
interactions of the entire organism with its environment. Indeed, the evidence that has
cropped up in the last few decades vindicates this position and cyborg theory needs to
incorporate it for a more balanced, comprehensive approach. And it is through a
discussion of its origins, as reconstructed by latest findings, that a better
understanding of our relationship with technology can be achieved.
The last few decades have made it emphatically clear that technology
precedes language. Language, or even a recognizable speech system, appeared fairly
late in human evolution - most theorists seem to agree about this. Estimates generally
range from somewhere between 100,000 to 40,000 years. But from the wealth of

4 1 am not implying here that textual construction o f the subject does not underline cyborg reality. It
plays an important role in its existence and its significance shall be elaborated in the next chapter. I am
only arguing that cyborg theorists often reiterate the precedence o f mind in their work while attempting
to alleviate the mind/body antagonism o f Western philosophy. For instance, in “The Cyborg
Manifesto,” Haraway states that cyborg subverts the mind/body duality. However, such claims often
go unsubstantiated.
Conversely, McNally observes that evolutionary biologists and postmodernists are at loggerheads
with each other. In fact, he writes that “much o f it stems from the postmodernist hostility to the anti-
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evidence gathered, we now know that human technology appeared much before that.
In fact, strange as it might seem, toolmaking did not even start with humans, but with
a species of monkey men belonging to the genus Australopithecus. The
australopithecines mark a confounding but crucial stage in human evolution. They
roamed the earth about two and a half million years ago, nearly half a million years
before the genus Homo made its first appearance. They were small-brained, perhaps
only a little bigger than those of any ape with comparable body size. More
significantly, these “man-apes” (as they are generally referred to by anthropologists)
were bipedal - not as erect as proper hominids are but definitely more than the
chimpanzee or gorilla. The fossil records of these species were first discovered in the
1920s, and have been intermittently uncovered ever since. The initial discoveries
raised a signficant debate in anthropological disciplines, primarily around brain size
and bipedalism. Prior to their appearance, it was believed that erect gait was unique to
the Homo genus, our actual human ancestors. Furthermore, bipedalism was seen as
the outcome of an increased brain size, as was the ability to speak and make tools.
Gould writes: “Most anthropologists had imagined a fairly harmonious transition
from ape to human - propelled by human intelligence” (207). Similarly, Washburn
says that “the prevailing view held that man evolved ready to his present structural
state and then discovered tools” (63). The brain-effect notion prevailed till the 1960s,
the australopithecines notwithstanding.
The most path-breaking discovery came from L.S.B. and Mary Leakey in
1959. At the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania (a site they would haunt for the next two

teleological materialism that is central to the Darwinian enterprise” (80). However, he acknowledges
that they are both guilty o f the same error: the separation o f mind and body, or culture and nature.
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decades for various other corroborative excavations), they came across the remains of
an australopithecine. This time they found something else with it - tools. Indeed, not
only did they unearth a hammer stone, they also located waste flakes from the
manufacture of tools (Washburn 65). The rudimentary “hammer” struck quite a blow
to existing ideas. Toolmaking, which was seen as an essentially human activity
caused by its enlarged brain, now became one of the causes behind the increased
intelligence of the hominid. In fact, “most of the obvious differences that distinguish
man from ape came after the use of tools” (Washburn 63). Washburn further argues
that both tools and bipedalism - both structural, corporeal changes - were responsible
for the complex social lives that became the hallmark of the hominid. McNally
writes: “A gathering and toolmaking mode of life would have required more intensive
and extensive childhood learning, prolonged adult-child bonds, food sharing, and
dissemination of technological, environmental and social knowledge, and skills” (92).
Such increased sociability and the need to communicate would ultimately manifest
itself in language. In this sense, technology becomes a central factor in human
evolution, a constituting activity. Now researchers are even conjecturing that
toolmaking might have started even before the australopithecines. Although no direct
evidence has emerged so far,6 meticulous studies of the teeth structure of
Ramapithecines (immediate ancestors of the Australopithecines) offer some hint that
they were no longer employed for purposes of killing or tearing prey, and “extrasomatic” tools were used instead.

6 Both Woolfson and Washburn argue that earlier tools, if they existed at all, would have been made of
wood or other perishable materials which have not been preserved in fossil records.
7 For more on this point, see Charles Woolfson., The Labour Theory o f Culture (New York: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1982).
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While these facts have been vindicated only through recent findings, few
scientists and thinkers had already speculated such possibilities back in the nineteenth
century, although without any visible impact. The first of them was obviously Charles
Darwin. In The Descent o f Man, his more anthropocentric follow-up to The Origin o f
Species, he briefly mentions the role of tools in evolution. Yet he did not quite gauge
its significance, as primate and early hominid technology are discussed within the
brevity of a couple of pages. The exploration of the importance of technology was left
to two social scientists, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx writes:
Darwin has aroused our interest in the history of natural technology,
that is to say the origin of the organs of plants and animals as
productive instruments utlilized for the purposes and those creatures.
Does not the history of the origin of the productive organs of men in
society, the organs from which the material basis of every kind of
organization, deserve equal attention. Since, as Vico says, the essence
of the distinction between human history and natural history is that the
former is the work of man and the latter is not, would not the history of
human technology be easier to write than the history of natural
technology? (Capital 442)
Although he never explicitly explored the relationship with technology and evolution
in his writings, Marx anticipates the work of modem day anthropologists. However,
according to Timpanaro, much of post-Marxism has betrayed an attempt to wrench
back Marx’s ideology from such materialistic affiliations. In fact, of the many reasons
o

Engels’ work has been discredited by Marxist (and non-Marxist) commentators, his
commitment to biological materialism ranks high on the scale. But Engels’ attempt to
marry philosophy and science is primarily the reason why his work merits repeated
visits. Indeed, seen in this light, he is arguably the first cyborg theorist. Timpanaro
writes that “Engels was in a way more sensible than Marx of the necessity to come to
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terms with the natural science, to link historical materialism (in the human sciences)
to physical and biological materialism” {On Materialism 32). Engels also extended
this idea to human praxis, as he thought this was where the divergent streams could
meet most effectively:
Both natural science and philosophy have absolutely ignored the study
of the effect of man’s activity on his mental processes. They consider,
on the one hand, only nature and, on the other, only thought. The most
essential basis of human thought consists in changing of nature by
man, not simply in nature as such; human reason has developed in
accordance with man’s alteration of nature. {Dialectics o f Nature 172)
Discussing his provocative, illuminating and oft-neglected essay, “The Part Played by
Labour in The Transition from Ape to Man,” Scarry explains that it “is now
understood to be in some of its arguments much less constestable than it was earlier
supposed to be” (252). However, one must still approach the essay with caution
i

because Engels’ arguments often degenerate into what is known as “vulgar
materialism,” in his unequivocal denunciation of everything linked to the mind and
ultra-veneration of the bodily and the corporeal.
In the essay, Engels essentially argues that human evolution was propelled by
the act of labour. Once the apes came down from the trees and began to move on
level ground, they dropped the habit of using their hands for movement and began to
achieve a more erect gait. With this, the decisive step was taken: “the hand became
free and could henceforth attain greater dexterity and skill, and the greater flexibility
thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation” (230).
Indeed, Engels notes the difference between the dexterous human hand and the
underdeveloped simian one. He argues that the human hand is perfected over time

8 Woolfson notes the total neglect o f Western Marxists o f recent advances in biological and
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through various activities. The more complicated the labour became, the more
dexterity was endowed to the hand. In this sense, Engels writes, with great emphasis,
“the hand is not only the organ of labour, but also the product o f labour” (230).
Indeed, he views the hand is the original tool, a perfect example of biological
technology, the making and remaking of the human body itself.
But, for Engels, the hand is only an intermediary in the transition from the ape
to the human. Anticipating Washburn’s comments quoted above, he opines that
toolmaking was the decisive step. However, both Washburn and Engels note that the
development of bipedalism, hands and tools cannot be seen separately; their growth is
intricately connected:
Tool use is both the cause and effect of bipedal locomotion. Some very
limited bipedalism left the hands free from locomotor functions so that
stones and sticks could be carried, played with and used. The
advantage that these objects gave to their users led both to more
bipedalism and to more efficient tool use. (Washburn 69)
Although when and exactly how the shift from apes to humans occurs is difficult to
pinpoint, toolmaking allowed human labour to take a distinct shape. In Capital, Marx
collates toolmaking with human labour, which he calls its “species character.” He
writes:
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and
controls the material reactions between himself and Nature... By thus
acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time
changes his own nature. (177)
Similarly, Engels observes technology marks the difference between humans and
other animals:

evolutionary sciences; see the introduction to The Labour Theory o f Culture (1982).
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And what do we find once more as the characteristic difference
between the band of monkeys and human society? Labour. The ape
band was satisfied to browse over feeding area determined for it be
geographic conditions or the resistance of neighbourhood bands; it
undertook migrations and struggles to win new feeding grounds, but
was incapable of extracting from them more than they offered in their
natural state... but all that was not labour yet in the proper sense of the
word. Labour begins with the making of tools. (235-36)
However, this is not to suggest that animals do not indulge in labour - not only
primates but even less complex animals do so. The bird makes its own nest by
collecting twigs; similarly, hunting and preying by animals involve physical activity.
Moreover, primates even show rudimentary toolmaking skills. Goodall has observed
that “chimpanzees sometimes modify the material to make it more suitable for the
purpose in hand” (84). For instance, during termite fishing, the animal often strips
leaves from a twig, or blades from a wide length of grass to facilitate their hunt. But
animal labour is restricted to use of their own bodies, or at best, a one-dimensional
tool. Animals do not appropriate nature to fashion something that is entirely new, and
more importantly, something that is not found in nature. A stripped branch is merely
an alteration of what already exists. This is best exemplified by an experiment
conducted by Russian primatologist G.F. Khrustov.
He conducted two sets of experiments with chimpanzees. In the first one, the
animals succeeded making a tool with definite parameters from a material of
indeterminate shape - pulling of a narrow strip of wood from a wooden disc that
could be inserted into metal pipe in order to retrieve a lure. In the second set, all the
parameters were the same except for the fact that the wooden disc was made of harder
oak and the strip could only be cut with an auxiliary tool. The chimpanzees were
given a primitive hand axe, which was used historically for similar operations. While
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the chimpanzees tried different ways to fashion the required tool (which Khrustov
notes are remarkable in themselves), none of them attempted to use the axe to make
the tool, or with any other object other than their body parts.
The making of tools with other tools, which the chimpanzees were unable to
do, is what characterizes human labour. In other words, toolmaking implies the need
to join, to organize, to “use another object or some implement as an aid in
manufacture” (Gruber 579). It also implies the cognitive awareness that when things
are brought together, they can produce more successful results. Toolmaking thus
bears not only the imprint of mediated labour, but also what labour necessitates,
sociability.
It has been observed that dual act of hunting and gathering coincides with
toolmaking. Animals generally hunt and devour their prey at the same time. Although
higher primates such as chimpanzees can sometimes show some cooperative activity
while looking for food, it is generally restricted to foraging: what they find, they
consume immediately. But even the australopithecines were presumably different in
their hunting and gathering activities. Just as they carried stones to their shelters to
make tools in future, they also carried food for future consumption (Washburn 64).
This food was most likely shared with others. So suggests the combination of bones
and artifacts at a “central foraging place” found at the Koobi Fora excavation site
(Isaac 315). Once hominids discovered the advantages of hunting, and especially
gathering, it gave them more impetus for more organized behaviour. In fact, many
contemporary anthropologists, such as Richard Leakey, single out gathering and
sharing, and not hunting, as a key to our humanization. Early hominid behavior is
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increasingly being seen as centred on group foraging and gathering rather the earlier
“man the hunter” or “survival of the fittest” models.9
This sociability is reflected in human toolmaking and vice versa. With the
arrival of Homo erectus about one million years ago, we find more evidence of
“cooperative hunting for large game, continuous use of fire, and relatively stable
central foraging stations,” all mediated by a complex set of tools (McNally 93). Such
tools were not only quantitatively distinguished, that is, by their degree of
mediatedness or complexity. McNally writes that there is a qualitative difference too:
“the cooperative organization of human toolmaking as a social process.” Peter
Reynolds has observed: “One chimpanzee does not dig the hole in the termite nest
while the other one prepares the stick. One chimpanzee does not provide a termite
stick for another to use. One chimpanzee does not hold one end of the stick while the
other strips the bark - unless it is planning on grabbing it away” (441). He further
argues that human toolmaking is based on “heterotechnic cooperation” in which “at
least two people anticipate the action of others and perform a complementary action
in order to produce a result that could not be achieved by a single individual
performing the actions in a series” (McNally 100). Indeed, tools made by Homo
sapiens, anatomically modem humans, can be seen as material manifestations of this
very cooperative instinct. Sapiens technology is characterized not only by it sheer
range (over 130 different tools have emerged so far) but also by the joining of

9 For a detailed discussion on gathering nature o f early humans, see Dahlberg Frances ed., Woman The
Gatherer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Richard B. Lee and Irven Devore Kalahari
Hunter-Gatherers: Studies o f the IKung San and Their Neighbours (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1976).
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disparate parts to make a single tool (a wooden handle joined to an axehead, for
example).
This heightened sense of cooperation, the freeing of the hands, technology,
and group labour also necessitated a key human behaviour: language. Engels writes:
“The development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer
together by multiplying cases of mutual support, joint activity, and by making clear
the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making
arrived at the point where they had something to say to one another” (232). The
cultural adaptations that were set into motion with the coming of the
australopithecines heightened the need to communicate with each other. In fact, early
hominid praxis precludes this need. The new way of life that was rapidly developing
only implies that early humans had the conceptual ability to carry out premeditated
and directed activities: “The most primitive kind of work, such as the quarrying of
stones by primeval men, implies a correct reflection of reality he is concerned with.
For no purposive activity can be carried out in the absence of an image, however
crude, of the practical reality involved” (Lukacs 67). Similarly, Dodzhansky argues
that “to make a tool for a future employment” one needs to form “mental picture of a
situation which is expected to arise in the future” (56). However, this image/picture
does not readily translate into language, although anthropologists argue that some
rudimentary, gestural form of communication (again made possible by bipedalism
and freeing of the hands) may have existed very early on.
Woolfson points to the Marxist formulation of “practical consciousness” in
this context. Marx thought of language as more than mere communicative textuality
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or orality; rather he considered it a cerebro-sensual system of organizing the world
and articulating our subjectivity (German Ideology 51). Pre-linguistic forms of
awareness, as evinced by the australopithecines and early humans, correspond with a
direct sensation of the environment: “merely consciousness concerning the immediate
sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons
and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious” (German Ideology
51). The idea of “practical consciousness,” although variously labeled, has been
vindicated by biologists. Drawing on their theories in his discussion of erectus
behaviour, McNally writes: “Human practical activity - praxis - involves a unique
relationship between conscious intelligence and bodily activity... while our hominid
predecessors were not fully human in this sense, they had embarked upon a path of
biocultural development in which we can see the rudiments of human praxis” (93). In
early hominids this conceptual ability and awareness is mediated by toolmaking:
The conscious use of physical materials to alter the environment
involves an ability to differentiate self and world in ways that favour
mediated activity i.e. activity characterized by the use of
intermediary objects (such as tools) to affect the environment to
determined ends... Perhaps more important is the way erectus
created tools for the purpose of toolmaking... With Homo erectus,
we observe the development of new and more complex mediated
activity, including the making of tools with tools. This suggests
some form of language may well have been in place - though
probably not anything like modem speech. (McNally 93)
Thus, we see that conceptual basis of hominid technology is essentially
constructional, which Kathleen Gibson views as a primary characteristic of human
intelligence. She claims that “humans break perceptions, motor actions and concepts
into small component parts and then combine and recombine these parts into higher
constructs” (in McNally 100). By extension, she argues that human and ape
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toolmaking is distinguished precisely in this area. Apes do not “use heat, adhesives,
knots or weaving to permanently join two or more objects” (in McNally 100).
This brings us to the issue of generativity, not only a central feature of
hominid toolmaking, but also of language —“from a finite set of words and a small
set of grammatical rules people can create an infinite number of utterances” (McNally
94).
For the distinguishing feature of human tool use is the human ability
to generate a growing number of complex and sophisticated
structures that require intermediate stages (particular tools of
assembly appropriate to these stages en route to construction of the
completed object. The use of tool to make a tool prefigures an
essential feature of human language: that unit activities are
meaningful only in the context of a composite product... Now given
what we know about hominid toolmaking, it seems clear that the
cognitive abilities necessary for making Oldowan and Acheulian
tools would have put into place some of the cognitive structure
necessary for language. (McNally 100)
Indeed, this aspect of toolmaking and language reflects a deeper cultural behaviour
that was prevelant in early hominids - cooperation. One has to agree with McNally
when he argues that theories of human cognition that take individualism or “the
isolated craftsman” as the point of departure are methodologically impoverished
(101). It makes more sense to assume that the success of group behaviour gave these
humans the cognitive realization that “unit activities” are not only meaningful in
context of a group or a “composite product,” but also beneficial. The ability to make
tools only emerges for a species with “highly interdependent forms of social
organization” - that is, “for a species for whom cooperation has proved
advantageous” (McNally 101). Reynolds argues that chimpanzees do not display the
ability to build polyliths because they lack the social life that mediates such physical
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relationships. Hominds learnt their lesson well from cultural praxis. Group activity
not only gave hominds the impetus to communicate but also pointed towards the very
structure and form of that communication. Primatologists have observed that
chimpanzees are capable of making isolated gestures. Here, the term “isolated” is of
immense importance - ape communication, when it exists, is extremely one
dimensional and iconic. Research has indicated that chimpanzees have the ability to
learn/produce distinct signs but their ability to generate multi-sign combinations or
new combinations of their own is still largely negated.10 Human communication, on
the other hand, bears the stamp of generativity and polylithic cognitive abilities:
Both activities are concatenated, both have rigid rules about the
serialization of unit activities (the grammar, syntax), both are
hierarchical systems of activity, both produce arbitrary
configurations which, thence, become part of the environment, either
temporarily or permanently. (Holloway qtd. in Woolfson 60)
McNally effectively sums it up: “Language, therefore, could be said to be bound up
with the cognitive and social skills involved in understanding how things - physical
materials, tools, and social relationships - ‘fit together’ and with the skills necessary
to actually putting them together” (102). Through labour and group activity, humans
constructed a possible image of their own behaviour, which they then invested in their
technology and language. This cultural behaviour must not be understood as merely
intellectual; rather it is an embodied sentience or praxis that is as much sensual as it is
cerebral. What the hominids found in their own bodies and their immediate
environments became templates for the way they extended their presence. The hand
extended to the club or the axe, the bodily gestures into words directed at others.

10 For a detailed discussion o f primate communication, see “Primate Communication and Culture” in
Woolfson’s Labour Theory o f Culture.
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Once these extensions were on the way, they in turn affected our embodiment - the
shaping of the hand through tool use or the development of more complicated forms
of praxis through communication are good examples of this process. In this sense,
Freud’s exhortation that through technology humans are perfecting their organs finds
a parallel in Engels’ assertion about the role of labour. Indeed, in humans, labour and
technology are indistinguishable - both are involved in the continual act of
production and reconstruction of the self.
According to Philip Fisher, “every cultural and productive act includes an
elaboration of the self outside the boundaries of the body” (133). In doing so, humans
not only reproduce their embodied selves,11 but permanently record them on the
object made. In the case of technology, there is an added dimension of perfectability:
The hand may itself be altered, redesigned, repaired through, for
example, an asbestos glove (allowing the hand to act on materials as
though it were indifferent to temperatures of 500 C),... a scythe
(magnifying the scale and cutting action of the hands many times
over,... a pencil (endowing the hand with a voice that has more
permanence than the speaking voice, and relieving communication
of the requirement that the speaker and listener be physically present
in the same space)... the natural hand (burnable, breakable, small
and silent) now becomes the artifact-hand (unbumable, unbreakable,
large and endlessly vocal). (Scarry 254)
Concomitantly, this bodily extension entails another cultural act: “the recovery of the
body and the self back from the materials in which it has been both expressed and
buried” (Fisher 133). Fisher uses the example of a coffee cup to explicate how this
transaction takes place: the cup, if seen simply as a stand-alone object, has its own

111 prefer the term “embodied self/embodiment” over the more traditionally one-dimensional “body.”
Embodiment precludes body and mind as an indistinguishable complex. In technological artifacts
human do not simply reproduce the body, but their embodiment. For instance, if we see printed text as
a communicative tool, then it materially congeals both linguistic consciousness and physical speech in
a way that one cannot be separated from another. I think both Scarry and Fisher use “body” to imply
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“harmony of actual parts, lines, and shapes.” But these different material parts while
forming a “body” of its own also rearranges and replicates the human body within its
structure such to form a corporeal continuum. Fisher notes that the handle is made in
such a way that the thumb and fingers can actually grasp and lift it; similarly, the cup
is of a particular size “because of the size of stomach, the appetite for coffee, the
number of sips that are felt to make up a drink” (139). By extension, he argues that
the retrieval of human embodiment from technological artifacts is not simply
metaphorical: “The cup is made up of handle that meets the hand conforms to it, a lip
that meets the lips” (139). If chairs have arms and legs, then they actually form a
prosthetic complex with the organic body. In this sense, the elaboration and retrieval
of the self is real - boundaries are truly breached, the body is actually reproduced.
Scarry claims that this is validated by phenomenological experience:
In his classic text on perception, for example, James Gibson calls
attention to the at once startling and (once stated) wholly familiar
fact that a person can literally “feel” at the end of the walking stick
the grass and stones that are three feet away from his hand, just as a
person holding the handle of a scissors actually feels the “cutting
action” of the blades a few inches away.” (248)
In fact, cyborg technologies make this experience even more sensuous, more real.
Scarry claims that the actual remaking of the body is an ultimate aim of
artifice/technology and the increasing confidence with which we intervene the human
tissue with artificial hearts, hips, eyes, immunizations systems bears testimony to that
(253).12

“embodiment,” but the clarification is necessary given the history o f the term. I shall use both terms
here for the sake o f rhetorical variation, but the implications are the same.
121 shall take up this point again in Chapter 3 in relation to cyborgian medical/biological technologies.
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There is yet another aspect of this extemalization of sentience that is
corroborated by evolutionary differentiation between animal and human behaviour.
Exchange and orderly sharing are not animal traits; they are rarely seen even in higher
primates. On the other hand, even in early man-apes and humans, cooperation played
a greater role than acts of dominance and individuality (Woolfson 24). Just like
language, technology can be seen as a mediator in this act of reaching out to others.
Both develop in early humans because they are necessary in the extemalization of the
self in a way that facilitates group behaviour. Scarry writes:
The notion that everyone is alike in having a body and that what
differentiates one person from another is the soul or intellect or
personality can mislead one into thinking that the body is shared and
the other part is private when exactly opposite is the case. The mute
facts of sentience (deprived of cultural extemalization) are wholly
self-isolating. Only in the culture of language, ideas and objects does
sharing originate. (256)
This complex, co-operative, symbiotic matrix of embodiment, language, and
technology is found in its Edenic state during the early days of civilization. But, as I
have hinted earlier, language destroys the equilibrium as humans become
“accustomed to explaining their actions from their thoughts” (Engels 238). This
significant turn can again be explained with the example of the coffee cup. Once the
correlation between the body and the object is established and the object is named,
the relation between the two becomes metaphorical. The “cup lip” becomes so
because we have endowed it with the linguistic symbol; the actual corporeal act of the
“lip” touching the actual lip fades into the background.
Similarly, once our technologies increase in scale and proportion, become
more complex in its reorganization of the body, the symbiosis is lost. Consciously or
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unconsciously, capitalist imperatives, the enormity of the factories, and
commodification successfully negate the very ties with toolmaking and artificial
objects that we have discussed so far. Scarry brilliantly sums up this mode of
detachment:
People in the West, though deeply committed to material objects in
their actions and intuitions, often verbally disavow and discredit
their own immersion in materialism, sometimes even scorning the
tendency of less materially privileged cultures to aspire to aspire to
the possession of these objects: that blue jeans are cherished in the
Soviet Union... that Sony recorders are prized in Iran, are sometimes
events greeted by Western populations with bewilderment, as though
the universal aspiration toward such objects... were a form on
incomprehensible corruption or an act of senseless imitation rather
than itself a confirmation and signal that something deep and
transforming is intuitively felt to happen when one dwells in
proximity to such objects. (243)
Western capitalist society is confounded by this need precisely because it continually
subverts the embodied relationship with technology. Fisher argues that once we have
built our technologies, a terror of the realm ensues: “The separation of the human
from the source of its own self-understanding becomes dominant. The image is
experienced as lost while the constructed realm seems inhuman and silent” (134).
Capitalism propels and encourages this silence.
Of course, there is a gap of thousands of years between the first tool and the
hyper-industrial environment of capitalism. It would be absurd to claim that we
become alienated from the technical world with the advent of the Industrial
Revolution. It is only fair to assume that this rupture gradually occurs over time.
However, the effects become most palpable with the advent of capitalism. Fisher
claims that terror and separation has characterized our cultural relation to the
technological, urban, man-made object world from 1830 to 1900 and to some extent
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now as a residual but moderated stance (134). It is this period that I shall scrutinize
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
INDUSTRIAL CYBORGS: MONSTERS IN THE MACHINE
Roughly between 2000 and 3000 B.C., the Egyptians built their spectacular pyramids.
Mumford argues that the strategic organization of a large number of workers and
tools geared towards a specific end that went into constructing these archaeological
wonders could be called the first “megamachine.” The megamachine would later be
perfected during the Industrial Revolution, but arguably (at least for Mumford) it
manifested itself for the first time in Egypt. Similarly, other technological innovations
that have sprung up during industrial times were not entirely without precedent. In the
sixteenth century, Leonardo da Vinci designed one of the first flying machines.
Roughly a century earlier, the printing press had already set into motion a more
effective way of disseminating language. Then, in 1564, a French surgeon called
Ambroise Pare demonstrated in his book, Dix livres de chirurgie, an artificial hand,
arguably one of the first recorded prosthetic devices that was a direct, although
mechanical, replica of a body part. Philosophically, Descartes and his contemporaries
were constantly articulating the intricate patterns of the human body through
mechanistic metaphor. Mazlish points to the works of Vesalius, Hans Wechtlin, along
with Descartes, which highlighted that “humans and machines function in the same
way and that they may be made to share interchangeable parts” (17).
Indeed, if technology had progressed through different trajectories in
historical time, what makes the Industrial Revolution stand out? Take, for instance,
the Egyptian “megamachine.” Although it brings into play an organizational,
disciplinary, and productive pattern similar to that of a 19th century factory, there is a
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crucial difference: the Egyptian counterpart is not a human-machine complex; rather
it is composed entirely of humans, using their own, hard physical labour with little
mediation from tools working towards the desired end. Neither does the making of
clocks in medieval monasteries or Pare’s artificial hand or even the printing press
have too many similarities with the industrial context. The former were mostly
personal efforts, which arose more out of pure scientific pursuit, and the will to
promote and conserve technical knowledge, than mercantile reasons. In this sense, the
city guilds and rural artisans (ironically the groups of people most hurt by the
industrial growth), and not these solitary inventors, can be seen as the forbears of the
factory system. However, the Industrial Revolution was ultimately forged out by a
close alliance between the capitalist investor, the lone scientist, and the skilled
craftsman. David Landes observes that, at least in Britain, the rapid dissemination and
development of technological knowhow was facilitated by easy financing for
innovators and their general acceptance by business communities (64).
Although the exact year is difficult to pinpoint (the dates vary from historian
to historian), the Revolution began roughly around mid-eighteenth century in
1 "X

England, quickly spreading to continental Europe and North America. Landes
writes that this is the first historical instance that marks a radical shift from a
primarily agrarian, handicraft economy to one dominated by industry and machine
manufacture. Technologically, two important changes occured: first, there was a
substitution of mechanical devices for human skills; second, inanimate power - such
as steam - took the place of human and animal strength (Landes 1). Linked to these
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was another pivotal socio-economic change. The factory was not merely a shift in the
scale of productive output; it was a system of production that reconfigured the
different facets of the entire process itself:
On the one side was the employer, who not only hired the labour and
marketed the finished product, but supplied the capital equipment
and foresaw its use. On the other side there stood the worker, no
longer capable of owning and furnishing the means of production
and reduced to the status of the hand (the word is significant and
symbolizes well this transformation from producer to pure labourer).
Binding them was the economic relationship - the ‘wage nexus’...
(Landes 2)
The Industrial Revolution was thus the explosive manifestation of years of economic
and technological progress. Indeed, before engaging in any critique of the
industrial/capitalist socio-economic structure, it is important to clarify that without
the aid of the enterprising (albeit avaricious) bourgeois entrepreneur, the scale and
speed of technological development would indeed have been much impeded. The
increased conjunction of humans and machines spawned a new productive force that
could achieve previously unimaginable feats. Even Marx, capitalism’s biggest
bugbear, admitted as much. But had growth and development been the only outcome
of the era, then the transition from human to cyborg would have been much smoother.
Instead with increasing technological proximity, the struggle between human and
machine intensified. The ideological roots of capitalist structure —individualism,
anthropocentricism, and profit - perhaps explain this paradox of physical conjugation
and existential rift.

13 For a detailed historical account o f the Industrial Revolution, see David S.Landes, The Unbound
Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the
Present (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969).
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Profit was perhaps the most crucial among these. It has been generally
observed that cotton mills produced the Industrial Revolution. Mazlish argues that it
is fitting that industrial culture begins with the making of clothes because of its
symbolic status as “artificial skin” - a remaking of the human body itself as well as
its protective prostheses. But the growth of the cotton industry also reveals the more
subversive side of capitalist technological practice. In pre-industrial times, wool was
the most important fabric manufactured in England. Although it was exported
overseas to the colonies and other European nations, its market was somewhat
limited, especially in the tropics. On the other hand, cotton was soon proving more
profitable both for export and national consumption.14 Landes states that since cotton
manufacturers made more money, they were able to mechanize their processes much
faster than other industries. This development was also ironic: the initial gains of the
cotton industry were not brought forth by the power looms, rather they were the fruits
of the hand-weaver’s labour. But, once the opportunity was seen, the “cottage artisan”
was soon consumed by machines that could produce up to fifteen times his output.
The growth of other industries - such as coal and iron - revolved around the progress
of cotton mills. Although coal and steam facilitated extraordinary development and
diffusion, Landes writes, they “did not make the Industrial Revolution” (99). Rather,
their use and efficiency were heavily dependant on the low-cost-and-more-profit logic
of the textile industry. Metallurgy, for instance, was primarily fueled by steam power,
which led to the production of more iron which was then subsequently used to build
better machines not only for the cotton mills, but also became the infrastructural base

14 According to Landes, “a whole series o f laws and decrees were passed from the late 17th century on
to stimulate the consumption o f domestic wool clothes,” in order to stem the growth o f the cotton
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of the entire industry. Similarly, the chemical industry, an area that is largely ignored
by historians of the period, was intricately linked to the needs of the cloth
manufacture.15 Many of the inventions, such as bleaching powder and strong alkalis,
proved indispensable for making fabrics. However, the mercantile will of the
capitalists was not only directed towards the textile industry. The growth was
definitely more complex but Landes argues that the cotton mills formed the initial
template for further development. What is important is that, for the first time in
history, all the industries formed a nexus - the level of co-dependence was without
precedence. They form a common logic - Marcuse’s “expedient mechanism” - of
their own, which in turn affects every other area of socio-political change.16
Furthermore, trading formed the backbone of the Industrial Revolution, not
manufacture, which actually became a mere means to an end. Landes traces the
coming of the industrial culture to the new men of commerce and banking who were
rapidly dismantling the subsistence economy of the medieval manor (15). The
private, individual capitalist becomes a more important figure than the king: “private

industry (82).
15 Marx makes a similar argument in Capital: A Critique o f Political Economy Vol. 1 (New York:
Vintage, 1977): “The transformation o f the mode o f production in one sphere o f industry necessitates a
similar transformation in other spheres... Thus the machine spinning made machine weaving
necessary, and both together made a mechanical and chemical revolution compulsory in bleaching,
printing and dyeing. So too, on the other hand, the revolution in cotton-spinning called forth the
invention o f the gin, for separating the seeds from the cotton fibre; it was only by means o f this
invention that the production of cotton became possible on the enormous scale at present required”
(504).
16 Indeed, this is the reason why the base-superstructure formulation - which irks Marx’s critics to no
end —seemed so obvious to Marx during his own time. For Marx, it becomes most pronounced and
more rigid under capitalist production, while it may have been less tenable in other eras: “While
working on an introduction to his Political Economy, Marx further relaxed the base-superstructure
relationship. Writing on the excellence o f ancient Greek art (versus the primitive nature o f ancient
Greek economics), he conceded that a gap sometimes opens up between base and superstructure between economic forms and those produced by the creative mind.” (Johanna M. Smith ed., “What is
Marxist Criticism?,” Frankenstein: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism [Boston: St. Martin’s
Press, 1992], 288). But in advanced society the economic base is all pervasive. Although the Frankfurt
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enterprise in the West possessed a social and political vitality without precedent or
counterpart” (Landes 15). Concomitantly, the exchange of goods (not their use)
formed the motive force of the new socio-economic structure.
This monetary imperative perverts the essence of human labour and
technology. Marx writes: “Thus the ancient conception, in which man always appears
as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political
character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modem world, in which
production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of production” (Grundrisse 488).
Marx’s argument here is central to his philosophy - primarily his conception of the
human - which I shall briefly outline.
For Marx, human ontology is anchored by production and sociability. In The
German Ideology, he writes: “They [humans] begin to distinguish themselves from
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is
conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence
men are indirectly producing their actual material life” (42). In other words, humans
are makers and creators - in producing food for themselves, inventing technology,
making artifacts and objects, they not only refashion the natural world around them,
but they also change themselves: “Man’s potential, for Marx, is a given potential...
man does change in the course of history; he develops himself, he transforms himself,
he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own product”
(Fromm 26). In this context, Marx continually refers to praxis - a mode of conscious,
embodied activity that imbricates both mental and manual labour and its dialectical

School critics often border on hysteria and exaggeration about this issue, one cannot deny the invasion
o f mass production - which always relates to the profit motive - in areas o f creative production.
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orientation of the self in the world. In a reversion of the Kantian model, Marx claims
that human conceptions, ideas, etc., must be seen as products of this praxis:
... we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor
from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to
arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on
the basis of their real-life process we demonstrate the development
of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. (German
Ideology 47)
In his critique of Feuerbach, he points out that his materialist contemporaries commit
the same folly as idealists: “The chief defect of all hitherto materialism... is that the
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively”
{Theses on Feuerbach 121). This statement has two crucial implications. First, if we
proceed to think of the material world - the world of objects, technologies,
production - as a purely contemplative image that had already existed in the mind and
its subsequent production is only a materialization of that thought, then we arrive at a
static view of the human - which is what idealist bourgeois philosophy does. What
Marx does is capture the historically evolving subject in the moment of its own
production, in the continual flux that emerges between one’s embodiment and the
material world. Second, he negates the individual essence of the human. The act of
contemplation is inwardly directed, towards the self; on the contrary, praxis turns
embodiment inside out - it involves a sensuous and communicative act with the
world of objects, nature, and of course other humans. This extemalization, turning the
self inside out, also sets into motion the dynamic of self-elaboration and retrieval that
Fisher and Scarry (drawing heavily on Marx) examine in their work. Since more or
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less the entire gamut of human praxis is mediated by technology of some form, the
latter acts as the interface through which this activity happens.
This exteriorization through praxis leads Marx to further contend that human
ontology is inherently social:
The production of life, both one’s own in labour and of fresh life in
procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand
as a natural, on the other hand as a social relationship. By social we
understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under
what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from
this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always
combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and
this mode of co-operation is itself a “productive force.” (German
Ideology 50)17
Therefore, through their productive acts, humans not only continually make and
remake themselves, but also bring this reconstitutive paradigm to society. Human A
makes a tool with the help of Human B through their own labour and tools, the latter
perhaps made by other humans. Similarly, Human C and Human D are engaged in a
different activity in which they make other objects. All these humans enter into a
relationship with one another only through the exchange of their productive objects,
the latter carrying forth the labour and the human image that has been recorded in
them. Through the circulation of these objects, the central objective of praxis - the
production of man - is not only fulfilled, but also universalized. Scarry claims that
what differentiates humans from other animals “is neither the natural acuity of our
sentience and nor the natural frailty of the organic tissue in which it resides” but the
fact that our sentience is “objectified in language and material objects and is thus
fundamentally transformed to be communicable and endlessly shareable” (255). For
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Marx, this sharing and recognition of the human element in material things and
activity are absolutely crucial. And that is exactly what capitalism impedes.
McNally claims that the increasing abstraction of sensual praxis is Marx’s
chief reservation against bourgeois society in Capital. He argues that the fetishized
commodification of objects and the subsequent alienation felt by the worker suspends
the transactory process, not only between humans, but also between humans and
objects. Marx contends that all commodities have a use-value and an exchange-value.
The use-value of the commodity belongs to the object itself - its ability to satisfy
human needs. For example, wood has a particular use-value which depends on its
intrinsic, sensuous nature and the way human labour fashions it to produce different
commodities - a table, a chair etc. Use-value is then determined by the kind of labour
that has gone into creating a commodity as well as the usefulness of that particular
1

ft

commodity. But once a particular object becomes a commodity, it comes into
contact with other commodities and its relationship with them is determined by the
rules of exchange, conferring an “exchange-value” upon that object. Exchange-value
abstracts human labour, in the sense that it is determined by the “average or socially
necessary” labour time that has gone into its production. Capitalism thus ignores “the
unique and unrepeatable moments of productive life-activity in order to reduce each
moment of labour to a quantum of universally exchangable labour in general”
(McNally 53). In the mechanism of exchange, all the “sensuous characteristics” of the
commodity are “extinguished,” as everything is measured by the abstracted notion of

17 See the “Introduction” to The Grundrisse (New York: Random House, 1973) and The Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts o f 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964) for more on Marx’s
social ontology.
18 Capital 125-77.
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money. Not just human labour, but the human sentience that has gone into making a
commodity, is concealed, as the commodities take a life of their own:
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consist therefore
simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social
characteristic’s of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of
the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of
these things... In the same way, the impression made by a thing on
the optic nerve is perceived not as a subjective excitation of that
nerve but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye. In the act
of seeing, of course, light is really transmitted from one thing, the
external object, to another thing the eye. It is a physical relation
between physical things. As against this, the commodity-form, and
the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears,
have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the
commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing
but the definite social relation between men themselves which
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form a relation between things.
(Capital 165)
While Marx’s detractors and postmodernists may argue that humans have no way of
engaging themselves other than through the commodity form, it must be noted that
Marx himself believed that commodities are the only way of exchange that there can
possibly be. He concedes that such “commodity fetishism” is inescapable as “it
attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities
and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities” {Capital 165). But
what troubles Marx are the ways in which this fetishism is intensified in capitalist
economy until it becomes all-consuming. In such a scenario, productive activity is
continually aimed at making wealth and commodities; the deeper human involvement
- “the production of man” - is thoroughly subverted. The worker feels alienated from
the object of his labour because of the lack of the recognition of the self in
commodities. Alienated labour must not be simply understood as a mere question of
poverty and inequality between the labourer and the capitalist. While Marx’s concern
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that the industrial proletariat is unable to enjoy the fruits of his own labour because
the capitalist appropriates everything that he or she has or produces is central to his
work, his concept of alienation has more universal implications:
A misunderstanding of Marx on this point is widespread, even
among socialists. It is believed that Marx spoke primarily of the
economic exploitation of the worker, and the fact that his share of
the product was not as large as it should be, or that the product
should belong to him, instead of to the capitalist... He is not
concerned primarily with the equalization of income. He is
concerned with the liberation of man from a kind of work which
destroys his individuality, which transforms him into a thing, and
which makes him into the slave of things... His criticism of capitalist
society is directed not at its mode of distribution of income, but its
mode of production, its destruction of individuality and its
enslavement of man - worker and capitalist - by things and
circumstances of their own making. (Fromm 48-49)
Indeed, what Marx mourns is the loss of continuity between the human and material
world (and by extension, between humans). In capitalist society, the material world
stands opposed to human endeavour, with a will, consciousness and logic of its own.
Since technology works in the service of capital, it
loses its immediate form and opposes the worker materially as
capital. Science, thus appears in the machine as something alien and
exterior to the worker; and living labour is subsumed under
objectified labour, which acts independently. The worker appears to
be superfluous in so far as his action is not determined by the needs
of capital. (Grundrisse 692)
As humans are more closely coupled that ever with technology and material things,
the alienation intensifies. As a result, fissures open, wounds appear, the struggle
begins at the points of contact within capitalist manufacture. Marx’s critique of
technology must be understood in this light. Closely related to the development and
conditions of capitalism, machinery “can only arise in antithesis to living labour as
property alien to it, and as power hostile it” (Grundrisse 502).
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Marx divides technology - in the narrowest sense of the term - into two
categories: tools and machines. The tool is a direct prosthetic adornment that a human
uses to extend the body and to perfect the capabilities of its own labour. The tool
replicates and betters a particular human action - the hammer mimics and empowers
the clenched fist, the needle sharpens and thins the finger. And in each of them, the
motive power comes directly from the human. Marx argues that alienation of work
exists throughout history, even when the tool is the only form of technology
available. But the prosthetic image is more easily recoverable from the tool; hence
praxis does not appear to be as contested as in the age of machines. But once
industrialization sets in, the capitalist reverence of materiality doubles the growing
sentience of machines.
According to Marx, the latter forms the primary difference between machines
and tools. Machines are not powered by humans: “it either generates its own motive
power, like the steam-engine” or “it receives the impulse from some already existing
natural force” like water, wind, and so on (Capital 494). Furthermore, tools were
“animated” by the worker “with his own skill and dexterity;” the machine “is itself
the virtuoso, with a spirit of its own in the mechanical laws that take effect in it”
{Grundrisse 712). The distinction is also one of degree and scale. The machine is not
only a conglomeration of many tools, but also of humans: “The machine does not
drive out the tool. Rather, does the tool multiply and expand, changing from a dwarf
implement of the human organism to the implement of a mechanism created by man”
{Capital 509). Hence, Ketabgian argues that “through a process of grafting and
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transformation,” the human prosthesis grows, “to become a body in its own right” (9).
It rearranges humans in its mode of manufacture reducing them to mere appendages.
In earlier modes of technological development, the appropriation of material
objects always arises from the human. Praxis involves the rearrangement of nature by
humans - for instance, the farmer combines the plough, manure, and domesticated
animals to change the land into a food-producing mechanism. Similarly, the tool itself
mirrors a particular embodied sentience, or a combination of them. For instance, in
weaving, the foot is the “prime mover of the spinning wheel” while “the hand,
working with the spindle, and drawing and twisting, performs the real operation of
spinning” {Capital 496). But, in industrial society, the trend is radically altered:
“Humans, who once used tools developed from nature as their own organs, are now
themselves the organs and instruments of their earlier prostheses. In other words,
humans have become the prostheses of their machines, while machines threaten to
assume the role of the dominant subject” (Ketabgian 9). Marx calls the machine
system an automaton which consists “of a number of intellectual and mechanical
organs,” so that the workers themselves can be no more than its “conscious limbs”
{Grundrisse 713).
The machine takes over the worker and the individual tool: “The machine,
therefore, is a mechanism that, after being set into motion, performs with its tools the
same operations as the worker formerly did with similar tools” {Capital 495). The
worker is reduced to the status of a mere “hand,” watching the machines and
correcting their mistakes, a “merely mechanical part of being the moving power”
{Capital 496). The machine thus fragments the worker, making him an appendage to
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it, simply a part of its “countless working organs.” This joining and redistribution of
human labour to the machine confounds the continuous relationship that was apparent
in earlier forms of technology. The distinction between human and mechanical is
blurred. Negating the organicism that might distinguish the labourer from the material
prosthesis, “Capital’s human appendage at times seems more mechanical that vital,
more an inorganic tool than a living organ” (Ketabgian 12). Marx’s worst fears of
material domination came true in the nineteenth century technological realm: in every
way the machine becomes more human than the human, it continually takes over the
essence of humanity and appropriates as its own - in the manufacture system, the
human is the machine’s dead, raw material which it animates and distributes
according its own logic. The technological conglomerate appears to be working
through a system of cooperation, closely echoing the social form of all human
endeavour. Indeed, the spectre of the “ghost in the machine” looms large, as each
individual component of the “cyclopean entity” seems to communicate with each
other - a potent premonition of our present-day cybernetic technologies.
However, Marx also dialectically juxtaposes the “prosthetic struggle” with
possibilities of intimate coupling. He makes it quite apparent in Capital, and
especially in Grundrisse, that the new human-machine complex can also be a
unifying propsect. In one instance, Marx criticizes contemporary technophile Andrew
Ure for his conflicting views on the nature of the factory. On the one hand, Ure
describes the manufacture process as “combined cooperation of many orders of
workpeople, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive
machines continuously impelled by a central power” (qtd. in Capital 544). On the
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other, he calls it “a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual
organs, acting in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of
them being subordinate to a self regulated moving force” (qtd. in Capital 544). In the
first case, Ure’s emphasis hints at a symbiotic relationship where subjectivity is
shared between machines and humans. Moreover, he talks of a “central power” which
by implication resides nowhere in particular; one can only assume that it arises out of
the combined efforts of the contending subjects. The second point stresses the
heightened subjectivity of the automaton. Marx is right in contending that these two
descriptions are antithetical, as he argues that the first is “applicable to every possible
employment of machinery on a large scale,” while the second is “characteristic of its
use by capital” (Capital 545). What he implies is that the first one holds true when
productivity is stripped from the capitalist imperative. Under such conditions, the
man-machine setting is perhaps not problematic any more; rather it marks the making
of a shared subjectivity between the two realms.
Ketabgian notes that Marx saw that the fragmentation of the human as a
“necessary illusion” spawned by capitalist manufacture: “In bourgeois economics and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete working-out of
the human content appears as a complete emptying out... and the tearing down of all
limited one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external
end” (Grundrisse 488). She further argues that the “elimination of humanness by
industrial culture is actually a means of further developing human content and
consciousness” - shrinking in order to expand (15). However, under these conditions,
a unified, static concept of the human is not only untenable, but also undesirable:
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In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be
developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his
relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social
powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for
a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this
complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. (Grundrisse
489)19
Marx sees the human as a work in progress. If humans make their own history that is
expressed in the exterior forms of society, culture, technology, then they also
introduce changes within their embodiment. “Praxis,” in Marx’s use of the term,
already precludes this gradual evolution. In the previous chapter we have seen how
the human body and mind have coaxially evolved through embodied labour.
However, if in early history, humans could be defined in terms of their immediate,
natural embodiment, it was because extemalization in the form of technology was
still at an extremely rudimentary stage. One can perhaps still imagine early human
embodiment in its pristine, organic form. But in advanced technological societies
such as the industrial era, technology ceases to be a mere mediator in human praxis. It
becomes a condition of embodied labour, immediately conjoined with the body
producing new forms of embodiment in which the organic is as vital as the inorganic.
With the progress from tools to machines, subjectivity ceases to be centralized in
either the subject or the object; rather it is located everywhere and nowhere, but
always along the join/fissure between humans and prostheses. Fragmentation and

19 This is the central difference between Marx and his contemporaries. During the 19th century, the
Industrial Revolution debate was very much polarized between technophobes and technophiles. The
former approached the technical question with the ahistorical human subject as the point o f reference.
As a result, the emerging human-machine complex appeared to them as a diminution o f the original
wholeness. On the other hand, for technophiles such as Charles Babbage, the machines are merely
more powerful amplifications o f the historically complete human. Although he observes that the
human recedes in industrial manufacture, he does not find this problematic because he does not see the
actual embodied prosthetic continuity (or discontinuity) between humans and technology. See his
Economy o f Machinery and Manufactures (Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelly, 1986).
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reconstitution of human embodiment becomes inevitable - human endeavour can
only be understood as a set of “productive forces,” a successive process of extension
and imbrication of the mechanical within the organic and vice-versa.
Thus, instead of referring to an isolated human as his subject, Marx
focuses on the join between humans and things, showing how
humans and inanimate objects together form a dynamic net of forces
and prosthetic connections. As Etienne Balibar notes, in Marx’s view
the subject is nothing other than practice which has always already
begun and continues indefinitely. Or to use Marx’s own terms, the
subject is nothing other than ‘praxis,’ a process of shifting prosthetic
growth and shrinkage. No longer entirely commensurable with
humanness, subjectivity becomes, for Marx, a moveable category, a
collection of prosthetic forces rather than a fixed material unity.
(Ketabgian 16)
But the join between humans and machines is never an easy prospect for Marx. As a
result, the multiplicity of prosthetic adornments in modem manufacture is always an
ontological, and not just numerical, concern for him. The question that Marx
continually asks is not how many machine/body parts are added or by what degree is
production improved and humanness emptied out; rather, his inquiries are directed at
figuring out the movement of objectivity and subjectivity within the industrial system,
the shifting arrangements of human and machine sentience. Indeed, for Marx, the
embodied integrity of the human is a problematic notion because it has always been
undermined and transcended in historical praxis. With the onset of the industrial
revolution, such transgressions have been rendered irrevocable. But Marx is
concerned with the polarization implicit in the human-machine relationship. To which
side the balance will tilt is a question of perception; what Marx does is outline the
dialecticism, instability, and possibilities present in this advanced form of
subjectivity. Under the sign of mourning and apprehension, he foresees the birth of
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the cyborg - scarred, fractured, mutilated but inevitable -- in the womb of capitalist
manufacture.
Of course, Marx never used the term “cyborg.” Rather, he often resorted to the
imagery of monstrosity in both his descriptions of the “intelligent” machines of the
industrial era, and the brutalized and fragmented industrial subject. Baldick cites
several instances in which Marx calls the capitalist manufacture system an “animated
monster,” 20 and the proletarian mass a “crippled monstrosity” (132-38). Noting the
abundance of monster symbolism in Marx’s work, Baldick remarks that “it is hard to
believe that Marx did not recall the Frankenstein story” when he employed the epithet
(132). Whether Marx had Frankenstein on his mind does not seem to be the important
question here. What is crucial is the link between monstrosity, technological practice,
and capitalism in the nineteenth century imagination. However, Marx pits one
monstrosity against the other - the “demonic power” of the machines is matched by
the “reassembled” proletarian collective. Even critics have generally treated the
machine and the human separately, dialectically juxtaposing them in a “monstrous”
struggle. But there might be another kind of monstrosity that is generated by capitalist
manufacture - the monstrosity of the human-machine complex, which arises at the
intersection of the two mutually opposing forces. And had Marx ever aesthetically
imagined this industrial subject, to toe Baldick’s line, he might have found the figure
of Frankenstein’s monster stunningly prescient.
Although Mary Shelley left most of the corporeal details of the creature to the
reader’s imagination, its appropriation by popular culture has been more articulate.
From the innumerable films to more recent television ads, the creature’s physiology is
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distinctive: different organic parts sewn together to monstrous proportions, the
violence of its production literally bursting through the seams. Perhaps the most
significant and unmistakable detail of all are the two tiny electrodes/bolts sticking out
of its head - a persistent reminder of both its artificial origin and technological
coupling. In this respect, the monster mirrors Marx’s industrial subject, the former
being a metaphorical congealment of limbs, machines, and a consciousness. In both
cases, the monstrous proportions and the machine component are its detriment and
strength.
Although it is arguable whether Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is the first work
of science fiction, it is surely the genre’s first potent and significant production.21 But
can the monster be called a cyborg? The creature satisfies the basic definition - it is
part organic, part machine. Of course, the technological/material aspect of the
monster finds more prominence in 20th century cultural appropriations - the elaborate
machine arrangements that go into its creation in the James Whale films and the
“electrifying” remnant grafted to its body impose the cyborgian status more
emphatically. In contrast, the novel hardly discusses the immediate conditions of the
creature’s creation: “The sequences so central to the film versions of Shelley’s tale, in
which the mystery of technology is reaffirmed through the iconic figures of electric
arcs and bubbling chemicals, have no place at this [creation] point or any other of
Mary Shelley’s narrative” (Montag 308). Moreover, the element of magic and

20 Marx also uses the term “cyclopean” in his description of modem industry in Capital.
21 Like so many other critics, Brian Aldiss in his account o f science fiction history, Billion Year Spree
(New York: Doubleday, 1973) emphasizes that Frankenstein is the first science fiction novel as we
know it now. Although he concedes that works such as Daniel Defoe’s Consolidator: Or Transactions
from the World to the Moon, a literary tract inspired by Newton’s “celestial mechanics,” predate
Shelley’s work by more than a century, he labels Frankenstein as the first science fiction proper and
the template for future work.
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alchemical mumbo-jumbo present in Victor Frankenstein’s efforts also makes reading
the monster as a proto-cyborg a little problematic. Yet the scientific concerns are all
pervasive in the novel. Botting emphatically argues that “rational science dominates
Frankenstein’s project”; Vasbinder too has shown the different kinds of
technoscientific knowledge that might have informed Shelley’s thoughts and her
consequent creation.
Science as a constitutive aspect of the monster is as significant as technology.
As Foucault observes (I shall discuss this in detail shortly), science in bourgeois
society becomes a discursive “machine” - a set of techniques and forces - operating
independently on the human subject, simultaneously penetrating and reconstructing it.
Although actual, material technology is involved in the same process, the discursive
domain forms a parallel structure producing new forms of embodiment and
subjectivity. Marx’s industrial subject only captures one aspect of the process in the
material conjugation of the factory worker and the machines. But in Frankenstein,
this reconstitution and transcendence of the human category is captured within the
entire gamut of socio-scientific practice. Thus, one must view the monster as a precyborgian figure not simply because it is a human-machine complex, but also because
it reveals the changing assumptions about what constitutes as human through its
technoscientific constructive principle.
The creature has elicited a multiplicity of critical and interpretative responses
ever since the first publication of the novel in 1818. It represents different things to
different commentators: symbolic marginalization of the lower classes, rise of
revolutionary politics in the 18th century and the concomitant discourse of the
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monstrosity of the oppressor and the oppressed, the hubris of modem science, the
dehumanizing mechanism of technology, and so on. While they work as different
modes of discursive interpretations that effectively elucidate some of the
scientific/social/political concerns that inform Shelley’s novel, they never quite
explain the essence of the creature as a whole. In this sense, both Shelley’s and
Victor’s work of suturing the discursive and embodied parts to produce a single being
is largely undone by modem criticism. The monster’s components continue to have a
fragmented existence; it never quite becomes a species, a unified subject. Attempting
to analyze this interpretative imbroglio, Botting writes:
The quest to uncover the secret of the text’s nature, to unfold once
and for all its living presence, its principle of life, does not reveal the
unequivocal or authorized voice, but discloses only monstrous
doubles, different and distant from any unifying figure. As
duplicates, the authors, the many Mary Shelleys that are endlessly
constructed and reproduced by Frankenstein’s critics, defer the
presentation of the originary being, a final and ultimate source of
meaning, and offer only divided figures of and in conflict, duplicates
that redouble and resist the Frankenstinian desire to reduce all life to
one principle.(3)
Baldick also finds the sheer number of different “monstrosities” a little disconcerting,
pinning the blame on Shelley’s “overloading of the novel with approximately parallel
codes of signification” (56). Of course, the criticism must not be read as an attempt to
tie down the novel to a central meaning. But in the case of Frankenstein, the plurality
of symbolism often abstracts the creature to a point when it ceases to be made of flesh
and blood —it seems to be tom apart into discursive limbs and torso, its meticulous
making unmade. But what does the creature stand for as a character, as a living
“human” being, as a species? What do its fractured parts (both textual and corporeal),
its different interpretations, mean as a composite? What are the premises which
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differentiate it from the rest of the characters in the novel, and do these premises have
a common, unifying thread running through them? Although it is question of
perceptual and critical inversion, the creature has to be viewed as a character on
whom different discursive concerns converge rather than as a being from whom these
diverge - a work of gathering the fragmented bits from the “charnel houses” of
Frankenstinian discourse.
As I have argued in the introduction, Mary Shelley brought many of the
concerns of the post-Enlightenment era to her novel. She structured her narrative as a
creative interweaving of her interpretation of contemporary ideas, an act which is
mirrored in Victor’s making of the monster. Consequently, the creature embodies
various scientific, technological, and political ideologies that characterize the period.
If Victor actually created a sutured body made up of parts culled from different
human bodies, then Shelley inscribed this body with various discursive concerns of
her age in which she herself was immersed. That Shelley was aware of this body-text
paradigm of her project is more than apparent in the preface of the 1831 edition of
Frankenstein where she bids her “hideous progeny” to “go forth and prosper” (197).
What Shelley therefore examines in her novel is the very nature of the modem
human, which is essentially cyborgian and is embodied in the monster. Both Victor’s
and her constitutive acts therefore reflect a deeper social process of discursive
construction that was slowly emerging in post-Enlightenment Europe. At the center of
this productive paradigm, stands the concept of “artificial” and “technology,” both of
which constitute the monster as cyborg.
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A crucial link between discourse and its constructive principle is provided by
the notion of “artificial man” - the primary goal of Victor’s pursuits, and as
Vasbinder notes, a central concern of many scientists of the era that most probably
influenced Shelley (35-50).22 In quotidian usage, the term “artificial man” often
implies mere inorganicity - for instance, the robot or the automaton. But through the
cyborg its meaning can be reclaimed to signify the “artificial” production of human
embodiment within the contextual space of the human body itself. Human
embodiment is neither a natural nor a given; rather, it is artificially constructed in
history through cultural discourse and technoscience. Critics have often noted the
tremendous upsurge in the invasion of artificiality within human embodiment during
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, which I think is one of the chief concerns of
Shelley’s work. The monster is a cyborg because it signifies this “artificiality” within
the fabric of the body, which ontologically differentiates it from the human.
Analyzing Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan in relation to the monster’s
embodiment of contemporary revolutionary politics, Baldick outlines the implications
of artificiality in Enlightenment Europe:
There is an uneasy feeling of human responsibility involved in this
conception, fully in accord with subsequent uses of monstrosity
since... the monsters of both poetic fancy and of political
organization are not made by nature but by fallible human arts...
[Leviathan and artificial man] both reflect the dismemberment of the
old politic as incarnated in the personal authority of late feudal and
abolitionst rule. They signal the growing awareness, hastened in the

22 For more on Shelley’s scientific models, see S. Vasbinder, Scientific Attitudes in M aty Shelley’s
Frankenstein, Studies in Speculative Fiction 8 (Ann Arbor: Bell & Howell, 1996). The socio-scientific
constructive principle used by Shelley differentiates the monster from earlier “artificial humans” such
as the Jewish Golem, whose creative secret lies in religious incantations: “Mary Shelley’s artificial
man... is the product o f a scientific experiment, not a religious ritual” (50). Similarly, E.T.A.
Hoffman’s “autokientic man” in his story “Automata” can be seen as a precursor to the modem robot a completely inorganic construct.
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heat of regicide and revolution, of destinies no longer continuous
with nature but shaped by art, by ‘policy’... (16).
What Baldick records here, through Hobbes, is the growth of the concept of humans
as artificial constructs, whose subjectivity is shaped by various discursive fields and
which necessarily implies an exchange between these fields themselves. Humans are
rendered ‘artificial’ in the sense that they transcend nature - their organicism is
violated by a set of cultural/discursive technologies at the intersections of which the
modem subject arises. The construction of the subject happens through particular
techniques and modes of operation which involve a process of discursive projection
and inscription on the tabula rasa of the body. Grosz writes:
... the inscription of the social surface of the body is the tracing of
pedagogical, juridicial, medical and economic texts, laws and
practices onto the flesh to carve out a social subject as such, a
subject capable of labour... a subject capable of acting as a subject
and at the same time, capable of being deciphered, interpreted and
understood. (119)
Foucault recognizes this primarily as a post-Enlightenment impulse when different
discourses were not only producing fundamental truths about the human self, but
simultaneously constituting the human subject - indeed, this is one of the recurrent
themes in his philosophy. For instance, in the first volume of The History o f
Sexuality, he illustrates this constitutive mechanism in relation to nineteenth century
sexual discourse and homosexuality:
This new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an
incorporation of perversions and a new specification of
individuals. As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes,
sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was
nothing more than a juridical subject to them. The nineteenthcentury homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history,
and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and
a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a
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mysterious physiology [...] It was consubstantial with him, less a
habitual sin than as a singular nature [...] the sodomite had been a
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species (43).
What is worth noting is the profusion of technoscientific metaphors in Foucault’s
analysis. Indeed, in both The History o f Sexuality and Discipline and Punish,
Foucault identifies the eighteenth and nineteenth century as the period in which the
scientification of socio-political practice and discourse occurs. In an effort to more
effectively organize and supervision of society at large, knowledge was rendered into
a technique of scrutiny, domination, and corrective discipline. Everything became a
set of strategies, a pool of discursive prostheses, through which the human populace
could not Only be manipulated, but also simultaneously constructed: “... there may be
a knowledge of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a
mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and
mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of the body”
{Discipline and Punish 26). Foucault thus conceives discourse as intellectual
“praxis,” which becomes a constitutive activity. What in Marx happens through
material, technological objects, finds a parallel in Foucault as discursive technology both amplifying the “artificiality” of the human.23 Similarly, just as Marx observes
tools morphing into machines in capitalist manufacture, Foucault registers the
transformation of discursive activity into a cultural “machine.”
In previous historical phases, language - the quintessential medium through
which discourse enacts itself - in the still dominant form of oral communication was
an intensely personal tool. As an intellectual prosthesis of the self and mode of social

23 In this context, I would like to draw attention to McNally’s insistence that Marx saw technology as a
“set of material, social and intellectual extensions o f the human body” (91).
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organization, language was still tied to the speaking subject, through which it not only
constitutes itself but also other subjects. In feudal and monarchic systems, the king or
the lord confronted his subjects directly. A decree of execution and penalization
established the direct relationship between the figure of authority and the subjected
self.24 However, with the advent of capitalism, language in the form of discourse
becomes a self-sustaining mechanism which detaches itself from a fixed set of
dominating bodies. It becomes autonomous and all-pervasive, a force in its own - a
machine. In this situation, the power to subjugate, control, and articulate a subject is
vested in the discourse itself- to put it in Marx’s terms, discourse generates its own
“motive force.” In his discussion of discourse as political technology and disciplinary
mechanism, Foucault refers to this “architectural apparatus” as machinery that
explores, breaks down, and rearranges the human body. And just as a struggle ensues
between the industrial subject and the “conscious” factory machines, a field of
resistance opens up at the borders of the discursive machine and the human subject.
But at the same time, the discursive machines attach themselves to the body, inscribe
it, and consequently leave their “mechanical” remnants on it, rendering it cyborgian.
Foucault argues that these two kinds of technologies — discursive and
industrial — are intricately linked during the industrial phase:
If the economic take-off in the West began with the techniques that
made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said
that the methods of administering the accumulation of men made
possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual,
costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were
superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact,
24 See Foucault Discpline and Punish: “In the darkest region of the political field the condemned man
represents the symmetrical, inverted figure o f the king” (29). Although Foucault uses this argument for
a different purpose, I think the statement has some relevance to the personalized nature of
language/discourse in monarchic/feudal structures.
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the two processes - the accumulation of capital and the accumulation
of men —cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to
solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of
an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and
using them; conversely the techniques that made the multiplicity of
men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital. {Discipline and
Punish 221).
The dialectical, contested presence of machines and humans within the industrial
complex is further extended to this political technology. If, on one hand, the socioscientific knowledge contains within it the germs of a better, disease-free, crime-free
society, it also operates within the rubric of power - not sovereign but strategic
power, power that is free of agency and essentially bureaucratic. Botting explicates
the Foucaldian polemic: “Power, not merely reductive, operates among conflicts and
frictions that destroy but also create, transgressing as well as constituting limits”
(161). Power welds material and discursive technology to humans in order to produce
new, complex subjectivities, which, while progressive, simultaneously open up
monstrous wounds and scars at their points of contact. In both cases, human
embodiment is moulded and refashioned, its subjective presence altered. I have
already demonstrated this reconstitutive paradigm in relationship to actual, material
machines within the factory system. Similarly, the matrix of power and discourse
forms a disciplinary “machine” which when imposed on the body renders it
mechanical - one that can be scrutinized, analyzed and changed according to will.
Foucault observes the increasing “mechanization” of embodiment in Enlightenment
practice:
The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on
two registers: the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which
Descartes wrote the first pages and which the physicians and
philosophers continued, and the technico-political register, which
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was constituted by a whole set regulations ... for correcting and
controlling the operations of the body. (Discipline and Punish 136)
The idea that the body is a machine that can be subjected to another machine marks a
violation of the anthropocentric principle, simultaneously signifying the body’s loss
of organic fullness. Such discursive and technological interventions set the stage for
the transformation of the human into the cyborg.
Frankenstein emerges from the historical moments that Foucault analyzes so
meticulously in his work. Many of the cultural concerns that Foucault examines as
characteristic of the period are latent in Shelley’s work. In the post-Enlightenment
period, gathering the knowledge of the human is always concomitant to its
deployment through a fixed set of techniques to reconfigure the category itself. The
scientific pursuits of Victor, his immersion in the discourse and practice of
contemporary technoscience, and the subsequent creation of a new species
emphatically reflect the historical processes observed by Foucault. The cultural and
political landscape that enunciates the practice of technoscience further complicates
the template with which Shelley frames her narrative. The birth of modernity in the
matrix of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century science, politics, and technology that
Foucault observes is reflected in the creation of Frankenstein’s cyborgian monster.
That humans can be changed - improved upon but also violated through the
deployment of politics and science - is implicit in Frankenstein. Critics have noted
that Shelley was influenced by among others two towering figures of her age: her
father, the radical politician William Godwin and the eighteenth century chemist, Sir
Humphrey Davy. Baldick points to the central issue in much of Godwin’s work,
especially his seminal treatise Political Justice - human perfectability. Godwin
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supposedly harboured the idea that “rational enlightenment would produce a new
perfect kind of human being” (Baldick 28). Although Baldick is quick to dismiss such
interpretations, he does notice what he terms “Frankenstinian mentality” in
Godwinian arguments such as “the term of human life maybe prolonged and that by
the immediate operation of the intellect, beyond any limits we are able to assign”
(qtd. Baldick 29). Not to be understood literally, what Godwin here alludes to are
scientific and post-French Revolution political possibilities, which he sees as grand
leveling processes through which a new species of humans might emerge. Godwin’s
political utopia is always conjoined with a certain level of technological intervention.
Similarly, in Humphrey Davy’s writings, one finds technoscience moored to the
progressive effort: “For Davy, human progress has no limits as it makes possible
endless benefits for society. When man has developed the powers of sciences, he
says, great social changes will occur that will erase class distinctions, leading to near
perfect society” (161). Similar aspirations, though undoubtedly more egocentric, are
voiced by Victor as he exclaims: “Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which
I must break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species
would bless me as its creator and source” (Shelley 36).
But neither science nor technology operates in an ideological vacuum.
Progress is always confronted by the means with which it can be achieved, which
necessarily attach it to the machinations of domination and exploitation.
Technological development in capitalist society is always tied to the profit motive. In
the factory, machines do not work for the benefit of the casual wage-eamer; rather,
they subsume the labourer into the manufacturing process designed to further the
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wealth of the capitalist. The atrocities of the industrial system subvert the progressive
essence of technoscience, fragmenting and brutalizing the workers, rendering them
monstrous, in the process. Moretti’s and Montag’s Marxist readings of Frankenstein
conflate the monster with the industrial proletariat: “The monster is monstrous by
virtue of its being artificial rather than natural; lacking the unity of a natural
organism, the monster is a factitious totality assembled from the part of a multitude of
different individuals... the urban mass that, because it is a multitude of rather than an
individual, is itself as nameless as Frankenstein’s creation” (Montag 303). However,
this is only half the picture. Foucault argues that discourse, whether scientific,
political, or legal, does not simply build up a body of knowledge. The extraction and
circulation of knowledge is intricately tied to modes of domination, of maximizing
the potentiality of the populace, of inculcating prescribed forms of behaviour. Both
the artificiality and bodily violations of these technological strategies render the
human subject monstrous, cyborgian.
Post-Enlightenment biological discourse - medicine, surgery, psychology, and
still nascent evolutionary theories - illuminates the above argument quite effectively.
Biology, in the sense of the knowledge of the body, is a particularly significant field
because it was the point of convergence for science and politics in eighteenth and
nineteenth century society. Critics have noted that the bioplolitical paradigm in
Frankenstein. For instance, Tim Marshall has discussed the repercussions of the
surgery/anatomist trade of the period and its relevance in the novel. Similarly,
Vasbinder notes that Shelley found critical insights into human psychology in David
Hartley’s works which she prodigiously used in her descriptions of the creature’s
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initial sensations. Moreover, in the monster’s description of its gradual self-civilizing,
the evolutionary paradigm is hinted at. The monster has lowly beginnings - in its
muteness and animalism, it subverts the creationist myth so central to the human
category. Furthermore, its gradual transition from an initial ape-like semi-conscious
sensuous presence to the development of a human consciousness not only preempts
the Darwinian intervention, but also moors it in cyborgian ontology:
It is with considerable difficulty that I remember the original aera of
my being: all the events of that period appear confused and
indistinct. A strange multiplicity of sensation seized me, and I saw,
felt, heard, and smelt, at the same time; and it was, indeed, a long
time before I learned to distinguish the operations of my various
senses. (Shelley 80)
Later on, the creature learns to make fire, not through premeditated actions, but
through trial-and-error praxis. The monster’s “toolmaking” forms a parallel with the
prehistoric technological engagements as it manipulates what it finds around itself till
it masters its first technique:
I examined the materials of the fire, and to my joy found it to be
composed of wood. I quickly collected some branches; but they were
wet, and would not bum. I was pained at this, and sat still watching
the operation of the fire. The wet wood which I had placed near the
heat dried, and itself became inflamed. I reflected on this, and by
touching the various branches, I discovered the causes, and busied
by myself in collecting a great quantity of wood, that I might dry it,
and have a plentiful supply of fire. (Shelley 81)
Indeed, Shelley uses the biological science of her day as a constitutive paradigm.
However, in the monster, these emergent knowledges not only reveal the internal
!

nature of the human, but also become a structural basis for a new kind of human
species, different from the historical perception of the human.
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However, Shelley’s text also evinces the awareness that there was a heavy
price to pay for the extraction of such reconstitutive biological knowledge. Medicine,
especially surgery, was a major area of controversy during the period. According to
Marshall, most controversial was the use of the bodies of criminals, destitutes, and the
poorer classes for furthering scientific knowledge; for example, in dissection these
practices resulted in outrage. But by the end of the eighteenth century, anatomists and
surgeons were given access to the executed bodies of criminals through increased
legalization of such practices which finally culminated in the Anatomy Act of 1832.25
While their exploration of human bodies seemed to further physiological knowledge,
the act of dissection was also viewed as a violation of the sanctity of the human body.
In the novel, Frankenstein is often revealed as an anatomist. His galvanic concerns
lead him to charnel houses where he dissects cadavers to understand the inner
workings of the human body. Furthermore, in the use of the bodies of the
marginalized classes, the surgeon’s trade became linked to a more insidious social
framework. Marshall writes that “surgeons were given recognition not least because
their dreaded ministry enabled authority to cast a widening arc of surveillance on
society” (135). Through dissection, surgeons were able to build up a body of
knowledge that established corporeal truths that could be used for effective regulation
and control and to differentiate between the normal and pathological, the human and
the monstrous.

25 Before 1832, surgeons only had recourse to the body o f criminals. The Anatomy Act increased the
availability o f bodies by legitimsing the use of destitute corpses. For a detailed explanation o f the
implications o f the Act, see Tim Marshall, Murdering to Dissect: Grave Robbing, Franknestein and
Anatomy Literature (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1995).
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However, surgeons were not the only ones involved in such strategic use of
power through science. The entire medical profession was complicit in the merger of
legality and scientific discourse. In I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother,
my sister and my brother, a collection of memoirs and articles that critically analyse a
particular case of triple murder in 19th century France, Jean-Pierre Peter and Jeanne
Peter sum up the constructive aspect of medical gaze:
For the first time doctors, men of the Enlightenment visited the
village and farms... these doctors were appalled to find the
universal poverty in the countryside [...] the nature of the people
they attended surprised them. In them known diseases assumed
bizarre forms, revealed aborescent ramifications. Their bodies,
their scabs, their ashen skin, the granulations and nodes of bones
and flesh, as reported by doctors, proclaimed that these were not
yet human and were still part of the animal, vegetable, or mineral.
Squatting in the mud of their farms they were toads, and sheep in
their credulous stupidity; and wolves when the hunger gleamed in
their eyes, and mad dogs biting the dust. Monsters. (179)
The diseases and pathologies that were revealed through such meticulous
examinations were then used to define what is human and what is not. The district
prosecutor’s description of the convict Pierre Riviere relegates him to the level of an
ape or a primitive:
He is short, his forehead is narrow, his eyebrows arch and meet, he
constantly keeps his head down, and his furtive glances seem to
shun meeting the gaze of the others; as if for fear of betraying his
secret thoughts; his gait is jerky and he moves in bounds, he leaps
rather than he walks (193).
Through medicine, knowledge of the body was not simply being turned into
discourse; discursive technologies were being continually made into new bodies with
new secrets and pathologies: “The body in the [surgeon’s] theatre is a construct of the
eyes which are being trained to constitute it... it is the knife in the hand that carves
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the object” (Marshall 131). The surgeon’s scalpel therefore becomes both an
inscriptive and constructive tool - “is it a knife or a writing implement?” (133)
Furthermore, in dissecting the human body and turning it inside out, the
surgeon/anatomist reveals its ugly nature - a whole new world of disease, entrails,
and pathologies. In the hands of science, the glorified category of the human, built in
the image of God Himself, is converted to a machine, an animal, a cluster of
pathologies. The principle of human life that Frankenstein seeks does not seem to
reside in the spirit, or the soul; rather it is formed in the organic machinery of muscles
and arteries. To put it in Haraway’s terms, nothing seems to convincingly settle the
distinction between animals, machines, and humans. In their examination of the lower
classes, medical experts continually discover the ape residing in the human. Similarly,
the human body is rendered a machine, one that can be broken down and reorganized
through the employment of other machines. But this human machine is not pristine in
its form; its outer beauty is only rivaled by its inner, hidden ugliness. The yawning
gap between the cyborg and the human is bridged by an all-pervasive monstrosity.
This monstrosity is embodied in Frankenstein’s creation. The experience of
seeing the creature becomes a revolting spectacle. When Victor animates the monster,
the fine human form is buried under the anatomical intricacies. In the creature, the
body is turned inside out: “His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and
arteries beneath...” (Shelley 39). Only on completing his scientific pursuit does he
realize that that his knowledge has transformed human beauty into nightmarish
monstrosity. Contrary to popular assumption, Victor’s science does not fail him;
rather his science alters his perception and reconstitutes the human in a new way that
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violates its apparent beauty, physical integrity, and symmetry. What is ironic is that
Victor was aware of this aspect of the medical gaze: “To examine the cause of life,
we must have first have recourse to death... I must also observe the natural decay and
corruption of the human body... I saw how the fine form of man was degraded and
wasted” (Shelley 34). The possibility of an aesthetically satisfying creation is
thwarted because of Victor’s knowledge of the intrinsic hideousness of the human
body, which foreshadows the way the creature is perceived. In a way, this knowledge
takes a life of its own and, embodied in the monster, confronts its creator.
The creature has often been viewed as Frankenstein’s doppelganger: “Victor’s
pathenogenetic creation of the monster can be seen as, among other things, an
emblem and consequence of psychic bifurcation” (Veeder 89). Similarly, Mellor
concedes that “many readers have noticed that the monster becomes an alter-ego or
double for Frankenstein” (136), even through she ultimately rejects the idea.
However, this interpretation is not really problematic and is made quite apparent in
the novel. As an aristocrat, bourgeois, scientist, and technocrat, Frankenstein is not
only the representative authority figure of the novel, but also the archetypal human
figure. He makes his roots clear early in his dialogue with Walton: “... my family is
one the most distinguished of that [Genevese] republic. My ancestors had been for
many years counsellors and syndics...” (Shelley 18). Similarly, his rationality and
scientific pursuits reflect the Enlightenment ethos, which used technology and
systematic socio-political practice to further the human project, for not only economic
and organizational purposes, but also for progress. But once his experimental quest
reaches its dramatic conclusion, he realizes what he has unleashed. Unlike the
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“abnormal brain” paradigm of the film versions, nothing apparently goes wrong with
Victor’s creation. In fact, just before his excitement turns into all-consuming
repulsion, he exclaims: “His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features
to be beautiful” (Shelley 39).
The exact reason behind the creature’s hideousness is never outlined - therein
lies part of the novel’s depth and ambiguity. But the lack of any immediate cause also
allows us to explore the dialectic of progress and domination inherent in scientific
pursuits that lurks in the background. The monster’s creation marks Victor’s entry
into the modem world whose paranoias and straggles take the shape of the monster as
Victor’s double. As if Victor (the Enlightenment and pre-industrial subject) extends
his sentience through science and technology into the external world only to recover a
transmogrified spectre of his own image in the object of his making (the postEnlightenment and industrial subject). In his scientific quest, Victor essentially
redefines in part through recombination the constituents of the category ‘human.’
Victor’s pursuits also coincide with the cultural emergence of the cyborg. The
transition from the human to the cyborg can be divided into two distinctive acts. First,
there is a production of the artificial world in the form of technology in which the
human image is registered. The emergence of the technological realm also coincides
- especially during the Enlightenment - with the growth of a body of human
knowledge. Both these fields essentially double the human self - in technology, a
mechanistic version of the self is created, while within scientific knowledge, a
discursive figure of the human is recorded. The act of doubling is then followed by
the transcendence of the human category. Once the machines are closely juxtaposed
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with the human and the knowledge of the body is imposed back on to the body, the
double and the original coincide to form a new subject, which I define as the cyborg.
My argument in Chapter 1 about the suspension of the transaction between the
human and the artificial realm perhaps needs a qualification here. Indeed, the
interaction is not so much stalled as distorted. Given the alienating circumstances and
the ensuing “terror of the technological realm,” the “recovered” human image
continually defies preconceived notions of the human in the industrial world; it
transforms into something monstrous, disfigured - the remains of the object into and
through which human sentience was extended irrevocably attaches itself to the image.
In earlier forms of praxis, because of its very nature and the social organization
attached to it, this image always remained intact. Indeed, the unified wholeness of the
image makes a separatist view of humans and technology tenable within the
diminutive, personal, and unubiqitious forms of technoscientific presence in pre
industrial times. But in the nineteenth century, aesthetic, linguistic, and discursive
“recoveries” continually locate the ghost of technology in the central metaphor - the
objective garb of Frankenstein’s monster. What was human is transformed into the
cyborg.
The monster plays out the role of this technoscientifically constituted
emerging being. It does not know God; its maker is Frankenstein - a mortal human
being. It understands the distinction between religious beliefs and the secular,
scientific truths that mark its own existence. Like the cyborg, its origin story cannot
be traced back original fullness and innocence of Eden,

its reality is fractured and

26 Haraway writes: “The cyborg would not recognize the garden o f Eden; it is not made o f mud and
cannot dream o f returning to dust” (A Cyborg Manifesto 151).
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alienating: “Like Adam, I was created apparently united by no link to any other being
in existence; but his state was far different from mine” (Shelley 105). While it loathes
the conditions of its own birth, it can turn to nothing else other than Victor’s
“workshop of filthy creation” with which it shares a love-hate relationship to ensure
its own existence and survival. Its only hopes of emancipation are science,
technology, and rationality, even though it has been scarred by them in the first place.
This techno-faith is sharply contrasted with Victor’s frequent religious
exhortations - “The God of heaven forgive me” (Shelley 66) - which are heightened
to a deep Christian fervour in the 1831 edition.27 Moreover, Victor continually yearns
for a world that is gone, or slowly fading. When he visits Oxford, he almost wishes
for a reinstatement of the old world order: “It was here that Charles I had collected his
forces. This city had remained faithful to him, after the whole nation had forsaken his
cause to join the standard of parliament and liberty. The memory of that unfortunate
king... gave a peculiar interest to every part of the city” (Shelley 133). The monster,
on the other hand, slowly destroys this world, as he wreaks vengeance on everything
that was dear to Victor. That Victor is continuously implicated in these crimes
highlights his responsibility in unleashing the new species in the first place. He finds
himself guilty for the wrongful accusation and execution of Justine for the murder of
William. In a more tragic twist, he is mistakenly arrested for Clerval’s murder.

27 When one compares the 1818 and 1831 introductions to Frankenstein, the religious convictions of
the latter become quite apparent. In the former, Erasmus Darwin and his scientific ideas are referred to
as a major factor in the novel’s development. (That the first was actually written by Percy Shelley and
the personal tragedies that had beset Mary in the years between could account for the ideological
departure). In this respect, the attitude towards science seems more ambiguous in the first preface. But,
in the latter, Sheley seems more morally inclined: “Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful would
be the effect o f any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism o f the Creator o f the world”
(Shelley 196).
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As the novel progresses, the dichotomy becomes the contested point. The two
ontologically separated humans are embroiled in a battle for one’s survival in the
unforgiving Arctic terrain. But Victor’s is a losing battle, as he is slowly consumed by
the monster - it “literally enters his body” (Mellor 135). While the reader is left
uncertain of the monster’s fate, Victor’s death completes the symbolic subversion of
the human category that he represents. Although it promises to “ascend” its “funeral
pile,” its extinction is not confirmed: it only disappears, “borne away by the waves”
and “lost in darkness and distance” (Shelley 191). Indeed, the endurance of the myth
and the monster- and even the fact that it has usurped its creator’s name - attests its
representation of an entirely modem consciousness. Baldick writes that Shelley’s
novel
explores the godless world of specifically modem concerns and
responsibilities. The myth which develops out of it turns repeatedly
upon these new problems of an age in which humanity seizes
responsibility for recreating the world, for violently reshaping its
natural environment and its inherited social and political forms, for
remaking itself. (5)
Here, the term “remaking” captures the central concern. In the wake of the
Enlightenment, the Western world was slowly coming to terms with the fact the
human category is vulnerable and violable - it can be dissected, taken apart, and
refashioned. Indeed, the significance of discussing both Marx and Shelley in this
context lies not only in their acceptance and analysis of this “remaking” as the
fundamental ontological truth about humans, but also the concomitant question of
responsibility that arises in the creative act. Both see a heightened fusion of the
organic and the artificial, the dialectic of progress and domination inherent in them,
and the consequent birth of cyborgs as monsters - industrial or otherwise. Lastly, they
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also contend that the very conditions of their particular societies make it impossible
for these proto-cyborgs to be anything other than monstrous, since “monsters have
always defined the limits of community in the Western imagination” (A Cyborg
Manifesto 180). Cyborgs in a way mark a violation of what has been historically
considered distinctly human. In their transgressive ontology, they coalesce into the
monster in bourgeois society which had to preserve its own view of humanity by
marking them as the "other."
In spite of Shelley’s clairvoyance, it must be noted that her novel was written
decades before the basic premises of a possible cyborgian ontology were mapped out.
The “human” category was still steeped in tradition - the ontological ground of the
new species could always be turned around and a simpler world could be envisioned.
Fuller writes that the “conservative society of Britain in the 1820s” was not ready to
accept “the cyborg potentiality” of the novel that suggested “possibilities and
revolutions” (225). The dialecticisms and contradictions- for instance, its ability to
invoke sympathy and disgust, recognition and repulsion - that the original monster
contained within it were rejected in favour of more one-dimensional readings. Fuller
notes that in subsequent popular stage adaptations of the novel “the role of the
supernatural is enhanced, the science downplayed... the monster is mute, an
incarnation of science gone awry than a speaking subject in his own right” (226).
Moreover, Victor is rendered “less culpable,” while the monster becomes a
nightmarish vision, more an aberration than a reflection of changing reality.
However, the bourgeois fear of transcending our material humanity, as
evinced by the cyborg/monster/human dynamic, is still largely prevalent in present
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society, in spite of the sheer magnitude of technological, scientific, and ideological
interventions. Haraway’s vision of “lived social and bodily realities in which people
are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of
permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints” (A Cyborg Manifesto
180) still remains largely unrealized. Indeed, the intentions of Chapter 1 and 2 were to
lay out the dialectics of technoscientific development - its struggles and
contradictions within an historical context —so that current anxieties, concerns and
possibilities can be more fruitfully explored. In a way, we have always been cyborgs;
the conditions of its ontological presence have existed ever since the first ape-man
learnt to use the first tool. But its dynamic has changed through history. The postEnlightenment period marks the beginning of the articulation of a cyborgian
ontology. Yet the overlapping but mutually opposing fields of tradition, progress, and
domination only configure a monstrous version of the cyborg. The next chapter shall
examine if such monstrosities can be overcome and whether the cyborg in the new
millennium shall take even more hideous forms.
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C H A PTER 4

MILLENNIUM CYBORGS: THESIS. ANTITHESIS. PROSTHESIS

Monstrosity, as we have seen, has an ironic, but indubitable, connection with
technoscientific progress and domination in post-Enlightenment Western culture.
Monsters emerge at the outer limits of the human realm, at the borders of the
dialectical separation between mind/body, organic/machine, nature/culture,
bourgeois/proletariat, imperialist/colonized, normal/pathological, and so on. Scientific
knowledge defines these limits, as technology is used to mark the body standing at
the tenuous threshold - simultaneously constituting and dissolving the chasm.
Let us recall the etymology of the term “monster.” The word originates from
the Latin term monstrare which means “to show.” Reminding us about the origin of
monstrosity in Madness and Civilization, Foucault writes that a “monster” is a person
or something that is exhibited in order to signify the distinction between the human
and the subhuman and caution us about any form of transgressive behaviour. Baldick
also notes another characteristic of monstrosity. He observes that monsters,
exemplified by mythical monstrous figures such as centaurs and satyrs, are generally
“composed of ill-assorted parts, sometimes merely multiplied to excess” (13). These
two definitions are central to understanding the overlapping emergence of monsters
and cyborgs in post-Enlightenment society.
During this period, technology - both industrial and discursive - bore
different consequences for different sets of people. Within the industrial structure, the
capitalist merely supervised. In contrast, labourers worked in close proximity to
machines. In being reduced to mere “hands” in presence of “conscious” machines, it
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was their subjectivity that was compromised, not the capitalist’s. In such a scenario,
the worker became the cyborg, the human-machine complex. The bourgeois/capitalist
distanced itself from these labouring subjects, not least because in the latter’s activity
it perhaps saw how its notion of the human category could be so thoroughly
subverted.
Both the biopolitics and discursive technologies of the era produced similar
but more socially pervasive effects. Science, especially medical science, penetrated
and studied the human body, turning its deep, hidden truths inside out. This
accumulation of human knowledge then invited a second strategy. Through the
political technology of the body, these knowledges were then projected back on to the
body to both limit the human category and forcefully reinstate the masses within
those limits through the imposition of the discursive “soul.” Those who could not be
rescued - madmen, homosexuals etc. - were labeled “monsters.” Through
technological inscription, their bodies were marked to demonstrate what the human
category should be. In fact, both sets of people were reconfigured within the
discursive matrix - on one hand, the scientific paradigm etched out knowledges of
animalism and subhuman behaviour; on the other, technoscience worked as a
preemptive effort to keep them from crossing the limits of humanity, a strategy that
was crucial for the effective management and control of society in general. The entire
collective was rendered cyborgian through this process, because it is "artificially"
constructed, as those successfully subjugated and those ostracized was meticulously
guarded by the spectre of monstrosity.
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The monster in Frankenstein symbolically blurs and subsumes these
constructed limits - that is why it is such a powerful cyborgian image. As a figure of
a new “species” engendered by bourgeois technoscience, it lays bare the
technological apparatus that has given birth to it in its “intricacies of fibres, muscles,
and veins,” its unwieldy proportions - the reality of the visceral body turned inside
out. It becomes a representative body carved out of all the different kinds of bodies the industrial, the pathological, the biological -- whose construction and articulation
were enabled by technology and scientific knowledge. It contains within it what is
human and what is perceived to be nonhuman - a collective embodiment of the
organic realm in which the technological has so forcefully penetrated. It
“demonstrates” human embodiment as an amalgamation of both biological and social
“truths,” which are not given but have been painfully extracted and then juxtaposed
with the natural body through a variety of technological structures.
The bourgeois/capitalist functioned by repressing this profusion of
embodiment since the growing knowledge of the body in post-Enlightenment society
brought with it an important but ironic concomitant. If, on one hand, the Cartesian
paradigm reiterated the primacy of the soul, then, on the other, biological discourses
OH

continually revealed the body as a primal locus of subjectivity. That is, if one
introduces changes into the body - and this can only be achieved through some form
of technology - then one’s entire “being” might be altered. This emergent,

28 Victor Frankenstein’s meticulous physiological research perhaps bears testimony to this fact. At one
point, he claims: “Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle o f life proceed? ... I revolved around
these circumstances in my mind, and determined henceforth to apply myself more particularly to those
branches o f natural philosophy which relate to physiology” (Shelley 33, italics mine).
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formulation went against the very ethos on which bourgeois culture was built.
McNally writes:
It could be said as a broad generalization that bourgeois culture was
like an organism with a hidden body. The body was there, to be sure,
but its existence was persistently denied by the head. Bourgeois
culture was spiritual, not physical. (4)
This bourgeois figure is not unlike Poe’s General Smith who exists as a spiritualized
essence, his diminished, depleted body signifying its forgetting and ultimate
abstraction. His “prosthetic body” is only an adornment, and is thus ultimately
dispensable. That prosthesis — the extension and development of the natural body —
is a fundamental human process with serious consequences, for both psyche and
physiology are either ignored or suppressed in order to sustain the metaphysical
essence through which bourgeois culture had learnt to express itself. McNally argues
that the basic dualism of mind and body, the subordination of embodiment, always
“maps onto a multiple sets of oppositions: capitalist/worker, white/black,
man/woman, straight/gay, culture/nature” (6) and so on.
While it resisted its own reconfiguration in the developing matrix of
embodiment, bourgeois culture transposed the knowledge of the body onto its
subjects of domination. The “body” became a representation of the marginalized
classes. Just as a machine can only defined by its physical attributes, the subjective
existence of subjugated classes is continually located in their corporeality. The
labouring body is demeaned “as an object of grotesque and repulsive processes, the
29 Also see Ron Eglash “African Influences in Cybernetics” The Cyborg Handbook (New York:
Routledge, 1995) 17-27. He writes: “The problems o f natural/artificial dualism encountered by cyborgs
are similar to those which plague activists and theorists in the long historical battles against racism.
Primitivist racism operates by making non-western culture too concrete, and thus closer to nature” -
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site of biology, instinct, sweat, and desire” (McNally 4). That is why their
subjectivities can be tweaked and altered by technological structures because in their
bodiliness they are equivalent to machines, not humans. Therefore, the transposition
of the “soul” in order to rescue the subject from its corporeal morass becomes such a
fundamental act in eighteenth and nineteenth century society. Be it the capitalist or
the juridical or medical strategists associated with the Foucaldian “accumulation of
men,” the purpose remains the same - to subjugate the tainted corporeal prison from
which the spirit must be liberated to continue the human project.
For the masses embodiment entailed an entirely different experience. In their
labour, their subjection to machines, discourses, and other bodies, they encounter a
radical change in their existence. In other words, their embodiment becomes the focal
point of their subjectivity. Their corporeality evokes changes in the mind - the
alienation, physical and mental fatigue felt by labourers in the factory, the seclusion
experienced by the poorer masses bears testimony to this fact. Their bodies become
continuous with the technological apparatus - the machine and the organic forming
the eiitirety of their collective experience. They are cyborgs.
The cyborg, at least in early capitalist society, was always the social “other” the people of the “body,” to use McNally’s phrase. For Haraway, this “other” status
of the cyborg makes it such a powerful figure for feminist politics, since the female in
bourgeois ideology is generally relegated to the realm of the body. She argues that
since the social “other” has been historically implicated in the technosicentific matrix,
then it should use it to reconstruct its subjectivity and subvert the dualities through

not really a culture at all, but rather things o f uncontrolled emotion and direct bodily sensation, rooted
in edenic ecology” (17).
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which its subjection has been articulated and perpetrated - “to mark the world that
marked them as the other” (A Cyborg Manifesto 175). In the form of the cyborg, the
repressed — the body, the other in the form of the proletariat, the colonized, the
pathologized — could always return and turn the tables. Shelley’s Frankenstein, as I
have argued, is particularly concerned with this reversal. The irony lies in the fact that
struggle is opened up by exactly the same technoscientific structure that the
Enlightenment and its contingent socio-economic form, capitalism, used to suppress
and cleave these categories. The cyborg thrives on this fundamental irony. The
cyborg is a potent force not because it can, once and for all, sublimate these
oppositional dualities, or radically overturn capitalist social structures. Rather, its
effectiveness lies in its recognition of the dialectic - its essence, if it has one, is
struggle, relentless resistance, subjective ambiguity and polarization, and lack of
closure. The cyborg continually confuses the dualisms: “It is not clear who makes and
who is made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind
and what is body in machines that resolve into coding practices” (Haraway A Cyborg
Manifesto 177). The cyborg is like a Moebius strip, in which the distinct dualisms not
only intersect, but then go on to usurp one another’s position - the dominator can be
dominated, mind can become body, what was deemed as nature is revealed as cultural
practice, man can become machine. In other words, it resists any kind of easy
definition, and does not concern itself with the construction of limits or stable
identites. Indeed, the first aim and effect of any kind of cyborgian praxis should be
one of destabilization which stands in sharp contrast to the human category.
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In my subsequent discussion, I shall only focus on the problem of
embodiment, because the mind/body problem, as I have argued through McNally,
appears to be the fundamental duality through which the human category has been
expressed. I think this particular duality is a good place to start since it lies at the root
of all other dualities. However, this does not imply that the other categories should
not be explored individually in relation to cyborgian praxis (Haraway, for one, deals
with issues of gender and sexuality), or that looking at the mind/body problem can
settle the other issues.
But what exactly in the current nature of technological praxis enables the
destabilization of dualities? Why could the cyborg not be articulated in early capitalist
society but can be now? Haraway points to the sheer momentum and volume of
scientific knowledge and technological practice as the major reason behind
possibilities of such a reversal: “In so far as we know ourselves in formal discourse
and in daily practice, we find ourselves to be cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimaeras”
(A Cyborg Manifesto 177). One should keep in mind Fromm’s explication of
Marxism in this context: in engendering the world of capitalism and its cultural
concomitants, both capitalist/bourgeois and proletariat are increasingly implicated in
it. In early nineteenth century the bourgeoisie could distance itself from the society
that it has created, but that might not be possible in advanced capitalist society as of
now. Technoscience has penetrated every day life in such a way that preserving the
human category might be an impossible task.
I have already discussed some of the new forms of technoscientic activity in
the introduction. Here, I shall attempt to explore the ramifications of some of these
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technologies within the context of the central concerns of the project. Following
Gray,301 categorize the four essential types of cyborgian technologies. First, they can
be restorative - in that they “restore lost functions and replace organs and limbs.”
Second, they can be normalizing - that is, they can restore “some creature to
indistinguishable normality.” Third, they can be enhancing - everything from the
Internet to spacesuits allows human sentience to overcome the frailty and limitations
of the body, and empower it with capabilities beyond its natural powers. Fourth, and
most importantly, they are reconfiguring. The last qualifier, in a way, contains all the
previous ones. Prosthetic amplification or restoration of embodiment itself implies a
reconstitutive process - the body is always changed in some way from its previous
state. Moreover, the first three characteristics, particularly enhancement, hold true for
technology of any period in human history. From stone tools to computers,
technoscientific praxis has been a process of extending our embodiment, in order to
both improve and transcend our organic shortcomings. But the reconfigurative aspect
underlines millennial technoscientific practice - its key difference with earlier
technological forms.
First, our current scientific knowledges allow us to radically rethink the way
human presence has been articulated. Indeed, the recognition of the dialectic between
the human and technological world has been only made possible by modem scientific
knowledges. Both Marx and Engel’s intuitive brilliance in capturing the tenuous
relationship between the two has been vindicated by the findings of anthropologists,
archaeologists, and biologists. But this restructuring paradigm, at least in past

30 See Gray, “Cybrogology: Constructing the Knowledge o f Cybenetic Organisms,” The Cyborg
Handbook (New York: Routledge, 1995), 3.
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articulations, largely resided in metaphor. For instance, the dispersion of subjectivity
in the human-machine complex could not be verified by any means because there
were no visible invasions of technology within the body. At the end of the day, the
worker appeared organically whole, unchanged. The bourgeoisie could always
reverse the rhetoric to assert that no matter what our form of material praxis is the
human category remains unaltered, which in turn implies that our embodiment is
inessential - the essence of the human resides in the mind. In the bourgeois world,
because of the nature of technoscience, the cyborg could only be speculative,
conjectural, and metaphorical. In her discussion of contending biosocial theories that
have emerged in the twentieth century, Haraway points to two contradictory scientific
paradigms:
Our bodies are the product of the product of the tool-using
adaptation which predates the genus Homo. We actively determined
our design through tools that mediate the human exchange with
nature... Gazing at the tools themselves, we may choose to forget
that they mediate our labour. From that perspective, we see our
brains and our other products impelling us on a historical course of
escalating technological domination... Or, we may focus on the
labour process itself and reconstruct our sense of nature, origins, and
the past... We may return from the tool to the body, in its personal
and social forms. (Theories o f Production and Reproduction 23)
I argue that the first perspective enunciates the capitalist argument while the latter
illuminates the cyborgian, socialist contention. While in the past it may have been
possible to side with the first argument, recent development in technoscience have
made it easier to articulate the latter perspective. In the last few decades, the symbolic
dialectic has been fleshed out, which in turn has enabled us to reimagine our historical
relationship with technology and its implications for embodiment. This actualization
of the metaphorical relationship forms the second significant characteristic of the
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reconfigurative aspect, and one of the primary distinguishing features of our new
technologies.
In the period between the Industrial Revolution and the present, technology
slowly penetrated the skin. During the Industrial Revolution, machines operated on
the borders of the human body - the lever touched the hand, the spinning wheel
touched the feet. The union or struggle is always to a certain extent metaphorical, the
relationship is not yet consummated. Even Pare’s “hand” attached itself to the body at
the exterior threshold - ontologically, the prosthesis could still be seen as a separate
entity. Similarly, the introduction of anaesthetic surgery by Lister in 1857 could only
be seen as a momentary invasion. Although the body is modified in some way or the
other, the technological transgression does not attach itself to the skin. Hence, the
body is returned to its original organic wholeness after the invasive act. Our recent
technologies offer no such comfort. Organ transplants are perhaps only conservative
instances. Kellner cites the more radical examples of real cyborgs such as Steve Mann
and Kevin Warwick. The latter, a professor of cybernetics at the University of
Reading, implanted an electronic glass capsule under the skin of his arm, so that
whenever he entered his university building, doors opened before him, his office
lights turned on, and his computer booted up (.Postmodern Adventure 186). The
radical conversion of the metaphorical to the literal, of text/discourse into bodies,
defines and distinguishes our time historically. Indeed, even Foucault’s “biopolitics”
of the body are no longer discursive strategies - the etching of text on organic matter.
Everything from smart cards to Warwick’s implantable glass capsule to Stelarc’s
multi-subject prosthetics open up new possibilities of surveillance, manipulation, and
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control by joining matter with matter. Tweaking genes in fact blurs the distinction
between the discursive and the corporeal, in the double act of both a change in the
codification of the body matter and an actual physical, material alteration. In a
complete destabilization of Foucault’s thesis, both “body” and “soul” interchangeably
imprison the other.
This reconstitution of embodiment has an important concomitant. The
restructuring of human embodiment that has been discussed in the previous chapters
was to a large extent accidental and time-consuming. The man-ape did not start using
stone tools with the intention of changing the hand; it had only instinctively meant to
rearrange its environment such that it would be more conducive to its existence. The
above argument does not, however, undermine Marx’s insistence that “man is the aim
of production” in earlier forms of technological organization; rather that happens
through an extremely circuitous route. For instance, the farmer changes his or her
immediate raw material by tilling the land. This in turn leads to better crops which
when consumed by humans refurbish and enhance their bodies. But this elaborate
process happens through history -it is neither immediately palpable nor verifiable.
Similarly, the political technology of the body in early capitalist culture developed
slowly, its effects on the body politic dispersed over a considerable period of time.
Furthermore, it was subversive in its mode of operation - at least one reason why
Foucault has to painstakingly investigate its presence.
But current technologies can not only be more accurately targeted at the
human body, they can also be pre-programmed to achieve desired results. In them,
both speed and precision go hand in hand - making the results immediately palpable.
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Take the instance of the construction of sexuality. In early bourgeois society, the
articulation and realization of sexuality and gender occurred through a discursive
reiteration of moral codes. What entails male and female sexual behaviour? How
should homosexuals act? Only by the employment of discursive technologies over
substantial historical time could “ideal” and “deviant” behaviours be recorded,
elicited, and also suppressed. On the other hand, medical and therapeutic
interventions today can radically change a man to a woman or vice-versa. Through
swift and palpable changes in the body, sexual difference might be erased.
This is why cyborgian technologies spell not only emancipatory possibilities,
but also danger. While the transgression of bourgeois limits marks the radical
character of cyborg ontology, it also opens up faster, and more precise, modes of
exploitative practice. Cyborg theory often veers away from this dialectic, revelling in
the reconstitutive paradigm but ultimately missing its socio-political implications,
especially in a world that has not quite exorcised the spectre of capitalism. In her
recognition of the intensification of the two opposing axes of domination and
progress, Haraway is therefore more an aberration than the norm in cyborg discourse:
From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition
of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction
embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse. From another perspective, a
cyborg world might be about lived and social realities in which
people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and
machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and
contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both
perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. (A Cyborg
Manifesto 154)
The precision and invasive nature of modem technologies is further accentuated by a
move toward an increasing physical restructuring of the technologies themselves.
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Machines in the nineteenth-and early twentieth-century factories were gargantuan
affairs. However, such proportional enormity was not just restricted to the industries.
Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine, the precursor to the modem computer, was a
mechanical beast itself. So were the computers used in the mid-twentieth century
primarily for military and extremely specialized scientific purposes. Heise points to
the enormity of industrial and early computer technologies as a major reason behind
popular fears of, and alienation from, the domain. Similarly, Fisher writes that the
“dramatic change of scale either towards the gigantic or the miniature” is one of the
five elements of the technological world that “seems resistant to the human image”
(140). One also gets the same impression in Marx’s work - the dwarfing of the
human by the “cyclopean” machines is indeed a visceral source of terror and
th

alienation in the 19 century factory. But the last few decades have seen an increasing
miniaturization of technologies. Those who argue that our machines have accmed
more human qualities over the years only tend to think in terms of increased
intelligence and cognitive flexibility. While that is true, the “humanization” of
machines in terms of sheer physical size and design is also a significant factor.
Freud’s observation that our prostheses have not “grown” on to us and give us “much
trouble” invokes not only the uneasy fit of earlier technologies, but also their
cumbersome quality. Eye glasses have become contact lenses, unwieldy gramophones
‘walkmans’ - once you start carrying around technologies on your body and the
comfort level of these attachments go up, they start becoming a more integral part of
your embodiment.
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The personal computer, which undoubtedly underlines millennium
technological advancement through its role in radically transforming the quotidian,31
presents the most representative and potent example. Through this completely
manageable, immensely portable, and quintessentially personal prosthesis, one can
literally open up to the world through a whole new mode of embodiment. In
conjunction with the Internet, the computer potentially revolutionizes socio-political
praxis, both on a global and local scale. Heise calls the PC a figure of “autonomy and
individual empowerment” as opposed to the “electronic mammoths” once owned by
the government, the military and big corporations (139). The computer, in this sense,
is more a tool than a machine - in fact, it is a tool that forms a steady network with
not only other tools and machines, but humans as well. If globalization (which is
potentially facilitated and fast-tracked by the Internet) stands for an increased and
subversive presence of capitalism, then it also bears the promise of a new community
and sociability fostered by a complex structure of machines and humans - the global
cyborg.
However, outlining the possibilities of cyborgian praxis faces significant
ideological and practical barriers erected by the logic of capitalism. Even today,
capitalist forces tend to bifurcate mental and manual labour, to suspend the intricate
relationship it holds within embodiment, to use technologies to escalate the presence
of the “mind” and the forgetting of the “body.” Karel Capek’s play R. U.R. (Rossum ’s
Universal Robots)22 provides a fecund image of the bourgeois trajectory. Capek’s

31 See Ursula K. Heise, “Science, Technology and Postmodernism,” The Cambridge Comapnion to
Postmodernism, Steven Connor Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 136-67.
32 The word “robot” comes from the Czech noun “robota” which means both “labour” and “drudgery.”
The metaphorical, ideological, and actual implications o f the term are profound in the light o f Marxian
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work is perhaps rightfully remembered for contributing the word “robot” to the
English lexicon, and for little else. The work is a jumble of confusing ideas which are
further obfuscated by the many contradictions in the narrative and plot structure. Both
political allegory and science fiction, the play however generates some incisive
insights into the nature of technological development and the choices we make when
developing them.
In the beginning of the play, Domain, the general manager of the robotmanufacturing corporation, relates the history of its foundation to an idealist, but
gullible, visitor, Helena. He relates that Rossum senior, a celebrated physiologist, had
settled down in a distant island to study “ocean fauna, full stop,” in true Darwinian
tradition. However, he managed to imitate protoplasmic “living matter” through a
chance experimental success, which spurred him on to create artificial life itself. But
Rossum’s efforts were unique: he wanted to develop humans organically,
painstakingly constructing “everything as in the human body” (7). Frustrated by Old
Rossum’s time-consuming efforts and lured by the profitability of building
mechanical slaves, his nephew overrode Rossum’s idea to spawn the mass production
of working robots. Domain elaborates the antithetical methods, making it very clear
which one he prefers - he says that Rossum junior only made it possible to make
“synthetic” automatons, while Old Rossum meant to do it “actually” (7). Rossum’s
nephew simplifies the whole process to enhance the productive abilities of the

discourse. Significantly, Capek wrote the play in the early (and ultimately short-lived) days o f
Czechoslovakian democracy. He was extremely critical o f both American capitalism and the new
fangled spectre o f Communism that was looming large all over Eastern Europe - two forms o f
dominant political structures that his country had been able to evade in the aftermath o f the First World
War. The latter position is explicitly analyzed in his 1922 essay, Why I am not a Communist. In this
sense, R. U.R. is a critique o f both these political ideologies and technical development under their
aegis.
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machines, so that more money could be made. In his scheme of things, the robots
were designed to perform only physical labour (make more robots, fight wars, and so
on) while the intellectual, or “mental” aspects of work - such as supervisory and
managerial duties - were predictably reserved for humans. Domain emphasizes that
“robots are not people... they have no soul” (9). Rossum senior, on the other hand,
approached the construction of “artificial” humans through a unifying prospect - an
embodied techno-organic species with both “mind” and “body.” In other words,
Rossum senior envisioned the “cyborg,” his nephew developed the robot.
Capek’s fictional critique of capitalist (and imminent communist) modes of
technological development evokes the persistence of dualities in late capitalism, one
which many postmodernist worshippers of technology tend to forget. Feenberg cites
the example of designing techniques practiced by General Electric during the middle
half of the last century. In the early days of the development of these types of
machines, the multinational corporation designed one that employed a
“record/playback” system that “facilitated the work of skilled operators by registering
their movements on a tape used to guide the equipment through an exact repetition of
the desired sequence of motions” (Feenberg 34). However, this method not only
proved less profitable, but also posed supervisory problems. Soon it was rejected in
favour of “the digital programming of the machine tools,” which “promised the
elimination of skilled labour on the shop floor” (Feenberg 34).
The irony lies in the fact that such dualities have persisted within a technology
- the computer and the Internet —that possibly has the maximum potential for the
subversion of such polarities. Of particular notoriety is Hans Moravec, whose ideas
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are often forwarded in cyborgian circles. Moravec makes a case for “downloading our
consciousness into our desktops,” such that the body becomes disposable and
infinitely exchangeable. Poster also argues that the increasing intervention of
computers in factories have changed the labour relations of the subject. While artisans
and assembly-line workers had an active, hands-on relation to the materials in
production, the new worker is increasingly involved in a disembodied mode of
labour: “Labour is no longer so much a physical act as a mental operation, a cognitive
act of interpreting symbols on a monitor” (Poster 12). Of course, as we have seen in
Feenberg, the elimination of skilled labour from the “shop floor” and the increasing
need of “managerial/supervisory” duties through the computer mark a new kind of
labour role, further expanding the chasm between mental and manual. While
structural rearrangements enact the bourgeois desire to supervise/control machines
through “mind” work, it only creates an illusion of “control” in the worker who is
apparently placed in the supervisory position. Even in his seemingly “mental” labour,
the worker continually finds himself subjected to the same structures of exploitation
that was contingent to early industrial forms of manual labour. I think late capitalism
is particularly insidious in its dual vision of labour. While it tends to radically
separate mental and manual forms (by extension, the body and mind), in its treatment
of the wage-eamer, it also conflates the two since there is little difference between its
treatment of factory workers in the nineteenth century and data processors in the
present one. If both the “mental” and “manual” forms of labour can be finally merely
measured by labour hours, does it not demonstrate that both forms of work are labour
after all and the apparent division is merely an illusion?
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The idea is better understood through the neo-liberal concept of
“postindustrial” society. According to Daniel Bell, “if labour and capital are the major
structural features of industrial society, information and knowledge are those of the
post-industrial society... a postindustrial society is characterized not by labour but by
a knowledge theory of value” (xii-xiv). Bell’s is a significant observation, but he also
makes the crucial mistake in distinguishing labour from the apparent “mental” work
of gathering, controlling, and distributing information. The very fact that the so called
“information economy” still thrives on wage-labour is reason enough to assume that
theorists are missing a crucial correlation between the two. Dismissing Bell,
Callinicos writes: “Routine white-collar workers whose insecurity, relatively low
earnings, and lack of job control place them in the same fundamental position as
manual workers” (124).
However, any clear distinction between mental and manual, mind and body,
hardly seems tenable amidst cybernetic technologies. Haraway writes: “Our machines
our disturbingly lively, and we are frighteningly inert” (A Cyborg Manifesto 152).
The growing sentience of our tools - the fact that they are “cybernetic” or
feedback/response mechanisms - undermines the human “mind” as the marker of
subjectivity in myriad ways. If Marx observed the growing “will” and
“consciousness” of machines within the industrial system, then current technological
modes have taken their intellectual presence to another level. The narrow capitalist
structure increasingly “empowers” our technologies; indeed, within its system, our
machines seem to confront us both ideologically and materially, leading us down the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

dodgy path of dualities that one wishes to avoid in cyborg ontology. It is never, any
longer, either them or us.
Cyborg theorists and postmodernists, as I have argued before, wittingly or
unwittingly reiterate this inherently capitalist logic. By confusing the dispersion of
subjectivity with the dissolution of embodiment, they often reduce our relationship
with technology to an exchange system of symbols, codes, and signifiers - a distinct
parallel to the capitalist reduction of materiality to the flow of money and abstracted
capital. Haraway labels the cyborg as “ether, quintenssence,” as opposed to the
opacity and materiality of human embodiment,33 reverting back to Cartesian dualisms
that she proposes to dispel through the cyborg. Criticizing this postmodernist impulse,
McNally writes: “Even when meanings are objectified at high levels of abstraction in sign systems, novels, currencies, dress codes, or digitized systems o f information they are always attached to human bodies, reinscribing them with language and
history” (9, italics mine). Margaret Morse poses the problem in even simpler terms. In
a chapter titled “What do cyborgs eat?” in her book, Virtualities, she writes that “that
the apparatus of virtual reality” does not make the body disappear, it only temporarily
hides it (141). Rather, the body persists in within the cyborgian structure, as the two
worlds of machine and organic are ultimately linked to “real, physical effects.”
Furthermore, the technological divide also brings forth the question of who has the
technology and who does not, who is a cyborg and who is not. Morse implies that a
cyborgian nation, armed with computers and modem weaponry, can physically harm

33 Haraway often attempts to offset her “Cartesianism” by resorting to the reconfigurative
embodiments o f science-fiction characters, such as the female protagonist o f Anne McCaffrey’s The
Ship Who Sang, who “is a hybrid of a girl’s brain and complex machinery” (A Cyborg Manifesto 178).
While these moves are rhetorically satisfactory, they hardly make a convincing argument.
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another one that has not been able to incorporate these technologies into its collective
embodiment. At the same time, technology protects the cyborgian nation from bodily
harm since it can operate its machinery from a distance, without being corporeally
involved in the process. Its lack of physical engagement also allows it to deny
“responsibility for the organic consequences of remote action” (143). Morse points to
the “virtual conduct” of the Gulf War and the opportunities it offered for “denying the
connection between war and human suffering”. She further writes: “Yet even for
relatively invulnerable warriors beyond the phantoms and under the technological
superskin, the temporarily invisible flesh that suffers hunger is still there, its demands
merely deferred” (143). One thing is clear in Morse’s argument: while modem
technologies can temporarily disembody the self, the problem of embodiment always
returns. It is crucial to look at the shifting dialectic of embodiment and
disembodiment within current technoscience, instead of merely claiming the
obsolescence of the body.
In fact, our interactions with new technologies continually reinforce this
dialectic. The very field of computer technology, its discourse and constitution,
reflects back on the embodied nature of the human on which it is modeled:
Computer science is commonly viewed as bifurcated between
software and hardware, between those whose central reference is the
machine and those whose focus is central intelligence, between the
engineers and the mathematicians. But this opposition, while
important at one level, disguises a certain consensus regarding the
man-machine relation. The electrification of science in the form of
the modem computer generates a discourse on the border of the mind
and matter and in doing so destabilizes the distinction between the
two. (Poster 149)
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The construction of the computer continually reflects back on the human.
Historically, the movement from tools to machines is characterized by the increasing
intelligence of material technology, as exemplified by the computer. But how did we
get from simple stone hammers to the laptop, from lumpy rocks to sentient machines?
One part of the answer lies in the heightening complexity of technological design
itself. The first tools were extrarodinarily simple affairs. But by the time of industrial
revolution, tools had been joined with other tools to give rise to a mechanism that
once set into motion could not only perform a number of tasks at the same time, but
could also do them with a reasonable amount of independence. In its material
complexity, the tool/machine became intelligent. Similarly, today's computers would
not be as "smart" without improvements in physical design. As the microchip gets
more complex, so does its ability to "think" increase. The same goes for the human.
Chapter 1 was particularly concerned with demonstrating the link between growing
intelligence with changing physical design — both in the actual natural body and the
extended technological one.
Similarly, in our interaction with the computer, the dialectic of embodiment is
enunciated in various ways. Working with a computer does not entail only linguistic
exchange. Anyone who has worked with a PC for the first time must have had to
physically learn how to effectively manoeuvre the mouse, how to hit the right keys,
how to orient it with the body so that one can make optimum use of it. Similarly,
Poster writes: “The possible radiation effects of working with computer monitors
suggest the strong link between computer and computer user. A symbiotic merger
may actually be occurring, one that threatens the stability of our sense of the
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boundary of the human body in the world” (4). We do not communicate with our
computer telepathically - when a key is hit, the “body” of the computer actually
touches the human “body.” The design and structure of a tool/machine are extremely
important - the move from PCs to Steve Mann’s wearable computers belies the need
to increase the levels of physical compatibility in the use of these technologies.
Similarly, the computer is not a “disembodied” medium. In transporting information
from one end of the world to the other, not only are electrons actually fired through
the circuits and wires, but the codes and texts are also channeled through a material,
infrastructural network that is deeply rooted in a particular form of socio-economic
praxis. And finally, the circle is completed when “the floating signifiers” are picked
up by real humans sitting in front of or attached to myriad electronic devices. This
communicative continuum constitutes and sustains the cyborg, perpetually shifting
subject-object relations through an extended interplay of embodiment and
disembodiment.
Cyberspatial embodiment has been one of the major aesthetic principles of
Austalian techno-artist Stelarc. Stelarc is widely misinterpreted for demonstrating the
body “as obsolete, deficient, perishable.”34 However, Stelarc himself insists on his
website that
Just as the Internet provides extensive and interactive ways of
displaying, linking and retrieving information and images it may
now allow unexpected ways of accessing, interfacing and uploading
the body itself. And instead of seeing the Internet as means of
fulfilling outmoded metaphysical desires of disembodiment, it offers
on the contrary, powerful individual and collective strategies for
projecting body presence and extruding body awareness. The
Internet does not hasten the disappearance of the body and the
34 See William R. Macaulay, and Angel J. Gordo-Lopez, “From Cognitive Psychologies to
Mythologies” The Cyborg Handbook (New York: Routledge, 1995) 433-44.
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dissolution of the self - rather it generates new collective physical
couplings and a telematic scaling of subjectivity.35
In one of his landmark performances, Stelarc was actually able to stimulate his body
through the motions of other remote bodies. For the choreography, he used a technocommunicative set-up called Stimbod. Within this structure, a definite part of the
body (this could be further enhanced to include different parts) was linked with
channel muscle simulators, which were connected to a touch-screen interface that
would map the movements of the muscle. This interface was linked via Internet to a
group of bodies located remotely (the performing body was located in Luxembourg,
while the simulator bodies were in Paris and Helsinki). During the performance, the
“prompting” bodies inputed several choreographed bodily motions into the
communicative device, which were picked up by the sensors on the performing body.
While one part of the performing body was moved by the performer himself, the
other was moved by stimulations received through the Internet from the other bodies.
In a way, Stelarc’ “split body” performance does away with the natural limits
of the body, the inevitability of a singular subjective experience, and personal,
corporeal space. But it also heightens the possibilities of different kinds of
embodiment, an interchangeability of both body and mind intermediated by, and
inseparable from, technology. Stelarc writes:
The problem would no longer be the possession of a split
personality, but rather split physicality. In our Platonic, Cartesian
and Freudian pasts these might have been considered pathological
and in our Foucaldian present we focus on inscription and control of
the body. But in the terrain of cyber complexity that we now inhabit
the inadequacy and the obsolescence of the ego-agent driven
biological body cannot be more apparent. A transition from psycho
35 Stelarc “Parasite Visions: Alternate, Intimate and Involuntary Experience.” Stelarc, Virtual Artists 4
Nov 2002 http://www.steIarc.va.com.au/articles/index.html.
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body to cybersystem becomes necessary to function effectively and
intuitively in remote spaces, speeded-up situations and complex
technological terrains.
Stelarc’s Stimbod explicates cybemeticism as more than a textual system of
codification, symbols, and signifiers. More importantly, it shows both body and mind
as extremely unstable categories which can be shaped and restructured through
technological interventions. In this, it allows us to map the cyborgian paradigm on to
historical configurations of the human. In the light of Stelarc’s performance, the
prehistoric human, Foucault’s biopolitics, and Marx’s industrial subject are revealed
as flaccid, but prescient premonitions of the reconstitutive paradigm. Stelarc’s
Stimbod becomes an open field where different impulses and forces meet - that is
what enunciates its particular embodiment. Similarly, in history, both the body and
mind are just blank slates on which different cultural, discursive, and technological
forces interact to give form to an embodiment that is contingent to the historical
moment of its emergence. In retrospect, the human becomes the cyborg - a shapeshifting entity.
However, the computer and the Internet present only one side of the story. In
fact, the dualistic assumptions of many contemporary commentators are sustained by
the almost pandemic focus on these two technologies. The principles of electronics
and cybernetics are widely used in other forms of technology which might help us to
take a more convincing look at the cyborgian paradigm. For instance, embodied
communication is a crucial concern for biological prosthetics. The success of
feedback-controlled machine parts, at least in the case of distinct bodily interventions,
is a question of matter communicating with matter, flesh talking to electronic chips
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Ill
and circuits. Scientists working in the field of bionics are particularly involved in
such embodied symbiosis. For instance, Dextra, a prosthetic hand developed at
Rutgers University, is one of the first artificial limbs that use a person’s own nerves to
feed electricity to the machine’s fingers. Similarly, artificially developed organs or
techniques for organ transplants have stumbled over the years on this exact point:
how to make two bodies talk effectively such that a fruitful coupling can be achieved.
For many years, and even today, the experience with artificial mechanical hearts has
been disappointing. Patients have often not survived for long, succumbing to blood
clots or infections. An interesting advance has been made by Boston University
Medical School which has developed a heart transport method known as the Portable
Organ Preservation System (POPS), which allows the organ harvested from people
who have just died to be placed into it such that it makes the “organ believe that it is
still in the body.” The smooth movement from one body to another is facilitated by
the intermediate technological incubator, such that the lived continuity of the organ
can be preserved. Once inside the other body, the heart actually starts beating and
grows.
The question of physical compatibility within the body also relates to that
outside it. Indeed, if we are to engage in any form of fruitful ontology through the
cyborg, then we have to tackle the question of embodiment since our current
technologies connect to both body and mind. I have already shown the relationship
between the use of a particular form of technology and its physical design. Only with
the development of the PC did the computer explosion among the masses take place.
The ease with which it fits into one's personal space and becomes a part of it plays no
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small part in its ubiquity. However, so far I have only been concerned with the
communication of the material with the organic and its implications for our
relationship with technology. But how are we to configure the role of language — the
mode of communication between one human and another — in current technological
practice? Have our configurations of language changed with the changing forms of
technology? Has language become cyborgian?
I return to where I began. I think I have adequately demonstrated the inherent
relationship between language, embodiment, and technology in Chapter 1. We have
seen how in early humans the polylithic mode of technological praxis, which in itself
is derived from the cooperative advantage of human labour, manifested itself in the
very structure of linguistic communication. Polylithicism implies that the two or more
objects in each other’s presence can improve upon themselves if they function
together in a certain way - that is by making stones “speak” to each other in a certain
way, their utility may be improved. This logic is translated into the human world - if
two or more subjects can effectively communicate with each other, then the limits of
the individual can be transcended through group actvity. However, the polylithic
always implies the embodied presence of subjects or objects. Orality or speech
represents the polylithic stage of human development in which “the self is constituted
as a position of enunciation through its embeddedness in face-to-face relations”
(Poster 6). Speech facilitates community and sociability, solidifying the ties between
individuals. Speech, in a sense, is tied to organicism. Since two people can
communicate only in the presence of one another and the essential tool of language is
either one's vocal chords or physical gestures, language is always tied to the
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immediate body. However, in the written/print stage, language is thoroughly
reoriented as “the self is constructed as an agent centred in rational/imaginary
autonomy” (Poster 6). Although the radius of communication is extended to a degree
previously unimaginable, written texts also stabilize and individualize meanings and
their interpretation - “transparent reality, univocal meaning, perfect representation, a
stable sense of the separation of self and world” become the hallmark of bourgeois
culture in the 19th century, which Poster links with printerly textuality (82). It is no
coincidence that writing, in the form of printing technology, reaches its zenith with
the coming of capitalism. Indeed, the “book” dislodges the embodied aspect of
communication; the “mind,” in the form of written text, establishes a control grid
over “bodies” that it does not even see, does not even know exist. Language detaches
itself from the body and becomes embedded in the text. The “autonomy” of the agent
goes hand in hand with the individualism of the bourgeoisie - the writer against the
multitude, the distribution of a group of dominating texts, strategies, and discourses
that performs the task of invisible, but omnipresent, inscription and subsequent
interpretation. Through the easy reproduction and circulation of texts in the form of
the physical word recorded on paper, discourse creates a wide arc in society,
imprisoning "bodies" in the interplay of meanings and representation.
But our current electronic and cybernetic modes of communication bring
about a crucial change - in this mode, “the self is decentred, dispersed and multiplied
in continuous instability” (Poster 6). Poster further argues:
While to some extent language is a tool for intentional action, and as
must be accounted for within the mode of information, language has
another, very different capacity: it is a figurative, structuring power
that constitutes the subject who speaks as well as the one that is
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spoken to. Electronically mediated communication has compelling
effects at this level of language. By distancing the relation of
speaking body to listening body, by abstracting from the connection
between the reader or writer and the palpable materiality of the
printed or handwritten text, electronically mediated communication
upsets the relation of the subject to the symbols it emits or receives
and reconstitutes this relation in drastically new shapes. For the
subject in electronically mediated communication, the object tends to
become not the material world as represented in language but the
flow of signifiers itself. In the mode of information, it becomes
increasingly difficult, or even pointless, for the subject to distinguish
a “real” existing “behind” the flow of signifiers. (15)
In one sense, new technologies enact the increasing abstraction of embodied praxis the intensification of the mind. But they also simulate the "physical." In
videoconferencing, television messages, or films, the world of physical gestures — a
nod of the head or a little flick of the hand — returns. On the screen, the self shifts
between the body and the text. In as much as one can see it, it is "real." But at the
same time one knows that it is distanced, it is a mere "illusion." The body is simply
reproduced within the technological interface, as it becomes continuous with the
machine — it becomes a cyborg. Although my argument might appear to be a
reiteration of a form of Cartesianism which the cyborg is supposed to subvert, it is not
so. The image appearing on a computer screen might not belong to the same person
whose voice one is hearing. If the "soul" forms the identity of the person and one can
retain one's identity by jacking into different technological spaces, then to whom do
the voice and image belong? In fact, they form a composite identity, a particular
embodiment within the technological structure which cannot be referred back to one
individual, one soul, one body. Language — in the sense of practical consciousness or
communication — loses a stable referent. Nothing remains clear anymore: who is
doing the talking? whose body is that? In this sense, the dualism of mind and body
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are not resolved in modem technology: rather they are exploded and destabilized to a
point such that any kind of certainty becomes unimaginable.
What the implications of this destabilization will be for politics of resistance
can only be imagined, which is beyond the scope of my work. While our new
technologies, especially the Internet, have been used for various kinds of radical
- j/r

politics in the past few decades, one has not seen enough instances to revel in them.
Maybe one reason behind that could be the inadequacy of recent theories of
technology to historically place themselves in the context of past and present cultural
forms, and to see the trajectories of embodiment — since without the occupation of
physical space resistance, politics, or culture means nothing — articulated through
technology.
Hopefully, my engagement with the cyborg has raised certain important issues
around the question of embodiment and technology. In her essay “A Game of Cat’s
Cradle,” Haraway perfectly illustrates my intentions:
What constitutes an apparatus of bodily production cannot be known
in advance of engaging in the always messy projects of description,
narration, intervention, inhabiting, conversing, exchanging and
building. The point is to get to how worlds are made and unmade, in
order to participate in the process, in order to foster some forms of
life and not others. If technology is a form of life, we cannot afford
neutrality about its constitution and sustenance. (63, italics mine)
Making, as we have learnt from Marx, underlines our essence — one could call it
cyborgian or human, depending on one's politics. And making always implies some
form of technological mediation. We started out from prehistoric, semi-conscious self
to reach to the hypertechnologized self of today. We have enhanced and historically

36 For examples o f the use o f current technology for political empowerment, see Kellner and Best The
Postmodern Adventure (New York: Guildford Press, 2001) 245-48.
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reconstituted ourselves, incorporating layers of technology — material, discursive,
social, or otherwise. Indeed, we live in and through our prosthetics — to put it in
Haraway's terms, they make and unmake us. And this double act always operates on
some psycho-physical space, within our embodiment, which irrevocably alters our
realities.
Finally, I shall return to some of metaphorical/real figures I have examined in
my text. Let us start with the prehistoric human. In this historical subject, we find the
roots of technology, the development of the human through labour and toolmaking.
Conversely, in Poe's General Smith we see the subversion of the dialectic of
embodiment - the mind is posited as the marker of subjectivity while the body is
disposable and interchangeable. Shelley's monster revives and shows this dialectic, as
it is bom out of a milieu that is slowly coming becoming aware of its own self
making. Last, we come to the cyborg, the symbolic figure of our technological
present, that facilitates the recognition and articulation of its own history as the
prosthetic self. However, the cyborg does not herald the end of the struggle. It only
allows us to map our past and present in the light of technological intervention and
the dialectic of making and unmaking.
This is why Gray’s coda to his introductory essay in The Cyborg Handbook is
so utterly misplaced. In the epistemology (and ontology) of the cyborg, Gray sees
daylight breaking. He posits the cyborg historically and ideologically as one that
heralds “thesis, antithesis, synthesis, prosthesis” (13). I, on the other hand, see the
cyborg only as the point of initiation to a world of contestation that knows no
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“synthesis,” no respite. In my vision, the cyborg articulates Gray's exhortation a little
differently: “thesis, antithesis, prosthesis.” Endless prosthesis.
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